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Abstract 
Different theories have been proposed to explain the development of nicotine 
dependence. Some theories suggest that nicotine has direct reinforcing properties, 
either positive or negative. That is, nicotine is self-administered because it produces 
pleasure or positive affect or because it alleviates aversive symptoms associated with 
withdrawal and/or other nondrug aversive states (e.g., depression). Another possibility 
is that nicotine has indirect reinforcing properties; that is, nicotine can act as an 
enhancer of other reinforcers and, as such, it can affect responsivity to reward.  This 
possibility was investigated in the present research. Specifically, it was hypothesised 
that reward responsivity would decrease in withdrawal; the difference between 
responsivity in withdrawal and satiation (smoking status) would increase with higher 
levels of dependency.  The effects of smoking status and dependence on affect were 
also examined. Five experiments tested these hypotheses using a behavioural and a 
subjective measure of reward responsivity and a subjective measure of affect.  There 
was no evidence for an effect of status on reward responsivity. The behavioural data 
indicated that withdrawal impacted task performance independently of responsivity to 
task-contingent reward. Some aspects of pleasure/reward (measured subjectively) 
were reduced, however, in high dependence smokers. In addition, withdrawn smokers 
showed reduced positive affect, and high dependence smokers showed increased 
negative affect, providing support for nicotine’s direct reinforcing properties. Strong 
support for the indirect reinforcing properties of nicotine, measured behaviourally and 
subjectively, in humans was not found.  
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produces the acute central pharmacological effects of smoking that lead to 
addiction (Stolerman & Jarvis, 1995). Nicotine is also harmful directly; it is a 
potent neurotoxin and was widely used as an insecticide in the past. Tobacco 
smoke inhalation is the most highly optimised vehicle for nicotine 
administration. Nicotine reaches the brain in about 7 seconds after the first puff, 
akin to the effects achieved via intravenous injection, and it reaches a peak at 
around the time the cigarette is extinguished (Ashton & Stepney, 1982). 
Overnight, nicotine concentrations fall to the levels seen in nonsmokers.  Hence, 
the regular smoker will typically smoke a cigarette soon after waking, and 
he/she will continue to smoke at regular intervals (every hour or less) 
throughout the day in order to maintain a roughly constant blood plasma level of 
nicotine.  
Thirty percent of boys and 36% of girls are regular smokers by the age 
of 15 (Royal College of Physicians, 2002). Nearly three quarters of adult daily 
smokers in the United States became daily smokers before the age of 20 (United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, 1994a). Tobacco abuse is a 
disorder with a paediatric age of onset and a very quick transition from 
recreational to compulsive drug use (Kessler et al., 1997). Once dependence is 
established, the majority of smokers will then continue to smoke for nearly 40 
years (Royal College of Physicians, 2002).  Cigarette smoking curtails the 
expected lifespan by 7 years among men and 6 years among women (Royal 
College of Physicians, 2002). It costs the NHS over £1.5 billion per year 
(Parrott, Godfrey, Raw, West, & McNeill, 1998). No other single avoidable 
cause of disease accounts for such large proportion of deaths and hospital 
admissions.  
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1.3 Theories of Addiction 
The DSM-IV-TR provides the gold standard for identifying and 
classifying dependence. However, it is essentially descriptive, and it does not 
give an account of why dependence develops.  
Variaties of approach to the development and modification of addictive 
behaviours have been described, including those guided by moral and medical 
frameworks (Marlatt, Baer, Donovan, & Kivlahan, 1988).  From the perspective 
of the moral model, addiction is a sign of weak character. Addicts are 
responsible for both acquiring and solving their addiction problems, and they are 
urged to exercise greater will power to overcome their sins.  The moral model 
has little support in the contemporary addiction literature, but it was 
predominant during the period of Prohibition in the United States, that is, 
between 1919 and 1933 (Strug, Priadarsini, & Hyman, 1986).  The 
medical/disease model of addiction was developed as an alternative to the 
victim-blaming orientation of the moral model. Advocates of the disease model 
hypothesised an underlying progressive disease process resulting in physical 
dependency.  Disease models of addiction suggest that individuals are not 
responsible either for the aetiology of, or the solution to, their addiction. Thus, 
disease models stop short of explaining how and why many people overcome 
their addiction without treatment or professional assistance (Perry, 1985). Other 
approaches, and the one taken in this thesis, focus on addiction as a 
motivational/behavioural problem (Di Chiara, 1995; Schuster & Johanson, 
1973). As such, addiction develops as the result of a maladaptive interaction 
between nicotine and the motivational and behavioural systems that form the 
basis for normal behaviours.  
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Within this conceptual framework, drug-seeking behaviour is viewed as 
operant behaviour in the sense that it is behaviour controlled by the reinforcing 
consequences of drug self-administration.  Reinforcers (e.g., drugs) are salient 
stimuli, events, or consequences that strengthen behaviour (e.g., drug seeking 
and drug taking). They can be primary (unconditioned) reinforcers, that is, 
reinforcers that require no training to be effective, or secondary (conditioned) 
reinforcers, that is, stimuli that acquire their reinforcing properties through 
learning (i.e., by pairing a stimulus with a primary reinforcer).  
An important premise of behavioural theories of addiction is that initially 
neutral environmental stimuli, through repeated pairings with incentive stimuli 
(associative learning or classical conditioning), acquire the properties of these 
incentive stimuli. As a result, they become secondary reinforcers or conditioned 
reinforcers that acquire conditioned response-eliciting properties. Moreover, 
conditioned reinforcers can carry over motivational properties and elicit 
conditioned motivational states, further enhancing the incentive value of stimuli.  
Thus, if smoking produces pleasure (unconditioned reinforcement) and 
cigarettes become conditioned stimuli that predict pleasure, then the sight of the 
cigarette alone should make the individual engage in goal-directed behaviour 
(drug seeking and drug taking) in order to experience pleasure. Thus, smoking is 
an operant behaviour in that it is controlled by its consequences, that is, the 
rewarding effects of smoking. 
The hypothesis that dependence is a behavioural problem mediated by 
conditioning has gained gradual acceptance. Scientists believe that reinforcers 
strengthen behaviour (e.g., drug seeking and drug taking) either because of the 
state they induce (positive reinforcement) or because of the state they alleviate  
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With the exception of the studies mentioned above, many researchers 
assessing the positive effects of smoking on mood used smokers deprived of 
nicotine.  Since withdrawal occurs rapidly after cessation of smoking and is 
associated with deficits in mood, it is difficult to determine to what extent any 
effects of nicotine simply reflect withdrawal relief (West, 1993). 
Results from studies with smokers as well as nonsmokers have not 
indicated positive effects of smoking on mood. For example, smoking a high 
nicotine cigarette produced more unpleasant feelings than a nicotine-free 
cigarette did. There was no increase in pleasant feelings following either the 
smokers’ usual brand or a high-nicotine cigarette (Gilbert, Meliska, Williams, & 
Jensen, 1992). Furthermore, although both cigarettes and nasal nicotine spray 
produced increased dizziness, neither produced increased mood, that is, 
relaxation (Perkins et al., 1994). Nicotine gum (4mg) did not produce any mood 
improvement in nonsmokers (Heishman, Snyder, & Henningfield, 1993). 
Intravenous nicotine increased anxiety over placebo in nonsmoking 
Alzheimer’s patients, and a moderate dose of nicotine increased ratings of 
tension, depression, and confusion over a lower dose in healthy nonsmoking 
volunteers (Newhouse et al., 1990). In addition, nicotine produced decreases in 
the Profile of Mood States Questionnaire and subjective effects that could be 
described as aversive, such as increased tension and confusion (Perkins et al., 
1993, 1994). Finally, nicotine worsened mood in nonsmokers and caused 
unpleasant symptoms, such as dizziness, dysphoria, and arm pain (Foulds et al., 
1997). Acute nicotine administered through smoking produced disorientation in 
nonsmokers (Soria et al., 1996).  
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sensitized.  Wanting evolves into craving, which manifests behaviourally as 
compulsive drug seeking and drug taking.  The crucial point here, and the 
disagreement of Robinson and Berridge with Stewart et al. and Wise and 
Bozarth, is that it is not the pleasure or “liking” associated with drug taking that 
motivates continued drug use but sensitization-induced excessive wanting that is 
independent of liking.  
In criticism of the incentive-sensitization theory, Di Chiara (1995) 
argued that if rewards act on a common dopaminergic mechanism and 
sensitization of the DA system produces a general increase in the incentive 
salience of rewarding stimuli, then one would expect a heightened attribution of 
incentive salience not only to drug-related stimuli but also to all rewarding 
stimuli.  This is incompatible with the addictive state whereby drug-related 
stimuli increase incentively motivated behaviour in the expense of natural 
rewards (e.g. food).   
In sum, although according to positive reinforcement theories of 
addiction (Stewart et al., 1984; Wise & Bozarth, 1987) drugs are self-
administered because they induce pleasure, with few exceptions (e.g., Barrett et 
al., 2004; Soria et al., 1996; Stein et al., 1998), it is not clear that benefits 
attributed to nicotine use, such as improved mood, are real.  Many perceived 
benefits are actually attributable to the negatively reinforcing properties of 
nicotine, that is, the relief of nicotine withdrawal symptoms and/or the 
alleviation of other nondrug aversive states, for example, anxiety and/or 
depression. Negative reinforcement will be discussed next. 
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dependence. The neurobiological processes that produce withdrawal (and 
dependence) are activated at the first exposure to nicotine (Baker, Piper, 
McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 2004; Eissenberg, 2004). 
Initial drug-use episodes, frequently characterised by low doses and 
irregular dosing intervals, may be insufficient to support dependence. However, 
they set off the neurobiological processes responsible for withdrawal (and hence 
dependence). Individuals who begin their tobacco use career with occasional 
cigarettes (e.g., smoking at weekends) may not necessarily experience 
withdrawal. Dependence and a concomitant abstinence-induced withdrawal 
syndrome become more likely as tobacco-use episodes become more frequent. 
Thus, initial drug-use episodes may not support behaviourally motivating 
withdrawal. In other words, withdrawal may not negatively reinforce subsequent 
drug use. At this stage, dependence may not have developed.  Instead, the direct, 
positive actions of the drug and/or socio-cultural rewards, rather than 
withdrawal escape, motivate these early-use episodes.  The onset of dependence 
occurs when escape or avoidance of withdrawal first begins to motivate drug 
use, and self-administration becomes driven by negative reinforcement.   
The transition from behaviour motivated by other factors (e.g., positive 
reinforcement and socio-cultural rewards) to behaviour motivated by negative 
reinforcement may be a critical period in an individual’s drug-use career.  Drug-
use episodes before this transition phase mark nondependent drug use, whereas 
drug-use episodes after this transition phase mark the early stages of dependent 
drug use. It follows that withdrawal builds incrementally over repeated exposure 
to nicotine (Eissenberg, 2004), that is, it is a continuous phenomenon. For 
example, in a US survey of 12- to 18-year-olds, the likelihood of reporting  
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the CNS (Simonson & Enzer, 1941). Stimulant drugs raise the CFF threshold 
(an increase in the rate at which the light flickers before it is perceived as 
steady) indicating better sensory processing, whereas sedative drugs reduce 
thresholds.  Administration of nicotine through cigarettes or nicotine gum to 
deprived smokers produced significant increases in CFF thresholds compared to 
nicotine deprivation (Sherwood, Kerr, & Hindmarch, 1992; Waller & Levander, 
1980). When nicotine was administered (through gum) to sated smokers and 
nonsmokers, the CFF threshold was not affected (Hindmarch, Kerr, & 
Sherwood, 1990; Kerr, Sherwood, & Hindmarch, 1991). 
In the Rapid Visual Information Processing (RIVP) test, a series of digits 
generated by a computer is presented on a visual display unit at the rate of 100 
digits/min. Participants are instructed to press a response button as quickly as 
possible when they detect sequences of three consecutive odd or three 
consecutive even digits (i.e., one hit). Speed and accuracy of information 
processing provide the measure of the performance. Administration of nicotine 
to deprived smokers increased speed and accuracy on the RVIP task compared 
to saline and placebo (Foulds et al., 1996; Mancuso, Andres, Ansseau, & Tirelli, 
1999; Warburton & Mancuso, 1998). Moreover, administration of nicotine 
increased performance after abstinence but not after nonabstinence (Hasenfratz 
& Bättig, 1993; Herbert, Foulds, & Fife-Schaw, 2001). Among sated smokers 
and nonsmokers, the evidence for an effect of nicotine on vigilance is mixed. 
Administration of nicotine to sated smokers and nonsmokers enhanced 
performance on the RIVP task (Foulds et al., 1996; Warburton & Arnall, 1994), 
and it improved performance in a simulated driving task (Sherwood, 1995). 
However, nicotine had no effect on vigilance, as measured by stimulated driving  
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task performance, in sated smokers and nonsmokers (Spilich, June, & Renner, 
1992). 
Thus, the evidence suggests that nicotine can reverse attentional deficits 
associated with withdrawal, but it cannot reliably enhance vigilance in satiated 
smokers and nonsmokers. Given that capacity limitations play a significant role 
in sustained attention, one explanation of these findings is that nicotine prevents 
reductions in processing capacity over time (Kassel, 1997). 
Divided attention is the extent to which individuals can simultaneously 
attend to more than one sources of information.  Researchers assessed the effect 
of nicotine gum on a dual task in which participants both tracked a target with a 
cursor and responded to peripheral visual stimuli via key press (Hindmarch et 
al., 1990; Sherwood et al., 1992). Results showed that nicotine helped reduce 
error tracking but had no effect on reaction to the peripheral visual stimuli.  
In selective attention studies, researchers assess the degree to which 
individuals attend to a target stimulus while simultaneously ignoring irrelevant 
or distracting stimuli. A number of different measures, including the Stroop 
task, the Prepulse Inhibition (PPI) task, and the negative priming task, are used 
to assess nicotine’s effects on selective attention. 
The Stroop test compares the time required for participants to name the 
ink colour of colour words that are incongruent (e.g., the word red printed in 
blue) versus the ink colour of neutral stimuli, such as noncolour words or 
coloured squares. Typically, the incongruent task takes more time than the 
neutral task because the tendency to read the colour word interferes with naming 
its ink colour. The difference in time between the two tasks is a measure of 
selective attention or distractibility (Stroop, 1935). In letter-search/cancellation  
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tasks, the time to search for target letters in an array of letters as well as the 
accuracy of identifying the target letters is a measure of selective attention. 
Nicotine administration to deprived (for 10 to 12 hours) smokers produced faster 
response time on the Stroop (Hasenfratz & Bättig, 1993; Landers, Crews, 
Boutcher, Skinner, & Gustafsen, 1992) and better performance on letter-search 
tasks (Snyder & Henningfield, 1989; Parrot & Roberts, 1991). Thus, nicotine 
can reverse withdrawal-induced deficits in performance on tasks requiring 
selective attention. In studies with nonsmokers, nicotine administration had no 
effect on the Stroop task (Wesnes & Revell, 1984) or on letter-cancellation tasks 
(Heishman et al., 1993) compared to placebo. Similarly, nicotine had no effect 
on performance in a visual single-target search task in sated smokers and 
nonsmokers (Spilich et al., 1992).  
The Prepulse Inhibition (PPI) effect is the phenomenon whereby a startle 
reflex is suppressed when preceded by a weaker stimulus. The PPI effect is a 
protective mechanism that serves to screen out subsequent stimuli during the 
brief time required for the effective analysis of the initial stimulus. Cigarette 
smoking in a group of healthy male smokers deprived of cigarettes overnight 
increased PPI compared to the smoking-deprivation condition (Kumari, 
Checkley, & Gray, 1996). Others (Della Casa, Hofer, Weiner, & Feldon, 1998; 
Kumari, Cotter, Checkley, & Gray, 1997) reported similar results. Thus, the 
evidence suggests that nicotine can reverse withdrawal-induced deficits in 
selective attention. 
The negative priming effect is the finding that participants respond more 
slowly to target stimuli, if they ignored them on a preceding trial (Tipper, 1985). 
He proposed that, when participants select the target stimulus in the first trial,  
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interference from the distracter stimulus is reduced by suppressing the 
representation of the distracter. Thus, when the distracter becomes the target in 
the second trial, its representation is less available causing participants to 
respond slower to targets that were previously distracters. The suppression of an 
interfering stimulus, as indexed by the level of negative priming, is an adaptive 
process implemented to overcome interference in selective memory.  As such, 
the efficiency with which distracting sources of information are inhibited 
provides a measure of selective attention (Tipper, 1985). Rodway, Dienes, and 
Schepman (2000) used the negative priming paradigm to test whether smoking 
enhanced the inhibition of distracting information. Thirty-six minimally 
deprived smokers (1-hour abstinence) were tested. Half smoked and half sham 
smoked. Smoking resulted in a significant negative priming effect in contrast to 
an absence of negative priming in the sham-smoking group. That is, smoking 
increased the suppression of distracting information compared to sham smoking. 
Thus, smoking reversed withdrawal-induced deficits in selective attention. 
However, there was no information whether this improvement was above 
nonabstinent levels.  
In sum, nicotine can reverse attentional deficits associated with tobacco 
withdrawal and thus facilitate attention (a) by increasing or preventing 
reductions in processing capacity, (b) by enhancing attention to relevant stimuli, 
and (c) by decreasing susceptibility to irrelevant (distracting) stimuli.  In support 
of these assumptions, nicotine treatment reduces attentional deficits, compared 
to placebo, in Alzheimer’s patients (White & Levin, 1999), in schizophrenics 
(McEvoy & Lindgren, 1996), and in people with attention deficit/hyperactivity  
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affective states (Parrott, 1999). Furthermore, over the course of the development 
of addiction, through repeated pairings of withdrawal-induced affective distress 
and smoking-induced alleviation of distress, smokers come to view various 
affective states, such as stress, as discriminative stimuli signalling that smoking 
will be reinforcing (Pomerleau & Pomerleau, 1984). In other words, negative 
affect may become a cue for smoking, even when it occurs independently of 
nicotine withdrawal. Nicotine has stress-reducing effects in nonsmokers too 
(File et al., 2001). Thus, nicotine’s stress-reducing effects may also operate 
through some mechanism other than relief of withdrawal-induced stress.   
Nicotine’s effects on anxiety may be mediated through its effects on 
attention allocation (Kassel & Shiffman, 1997). They exposed smokers to a 
stressor, that is, they asked them to prepare a potentially embarrassing, self-
disclosing speech. At the same time, they presented participants with a benign 
distracter task (viewing art slides). Smoking improved attentional focus on the 
distracter task. The authors suggested that, compared to smokers who did not 
smoke, smokers were less distracted by current internal and external stimuli that 
might promote anxiety. Consequently, they experienced a reduction in anxiety 
relative to smokers who did not smoke.  This attentional-mediation effect on 
anxiety may be more important than any direct effect on mood because smoking 
in the absence of a distracter task did not reduce anxiety (Kassel & Shiffman, 
1997). Thus, according to the authors, smoking is not inherently anxiolytic. 
Rather, it serves to divert the smoker’s attention from worries that might 
otherwise produce or increase anxiety. 
A third suggestion regarding the mechanisms that underlie the stress-
smoking interaction is that physical and psychological stressors facilitate the  
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Consistent with the self-medication hypothesis is the suggestion that 
nicotine use alters neurochemical systems (e.g., neurotransmitters such as 
acetylcholine, DA, serotonin, and norepinephrine) that may affect, in turn, 
neural circuits in the brain, for example, reward mechanisms associated with 
mood regulation (Pontieri, Tanda, Orzi, & Di Chiara., 1996). In support of this, 
the brains of living smokers showed a 40% decrease in the level of monoamine 
oxidase B (MAO B) relative to nonsmokers and to former smokers (Fowler et 
al., 1996). MAO B is involved in the breakdown of DA. Thus, MAO B 
inhibition is associated with enhanced activity of DA, a neurotransmitter 
implicated in reinforcing and motivating behaviours. Depression itself may 
reduce the performance of behaviours that produce reinforcement. Therefore, 
depressed smokers will use nicotine because, through its indirect effects on DA, 
nicotine and smoking may increase the chances of obtaining environmental 
reinforcement (Hall, Munoz, Reus, & Sees, 1993). 
In sum, depression may constitute a risk factor for smoking initiation, 
maintenance, and relapse because nicotine can serve to alleviate the negative 
affective state associated with depression. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that some of the ways in which nicotine 
provides negative reinforcement include improvement in performance requiring 
attentional processing and alleviation of stress/anxiety and depression. However, 
nicotine also serves to alleviate aversive states that are associated with 
discontinuation of nicotine administration. Negative reinforcement based on 
nicotine withdrawal will be discussed next. 
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(43%), irritability (40%), impatience (38%), difficulty concentrating (36%), 
restlessness (35%), craving (31%), sleep disturbances (31%), hunger (26%), 
somatic complaints (24%), fatigue (20%), gastrointestinal tract problems (16%), 
headaches (12%), and drowsiness (4%).  Observers ignored self-reported 
symptoms and based their ratings on observed changes in the participants’ 
behaviour.  Observers reported most self-report withdrawal symptoms.  More 
important, the mean scores on the POMS indicated that, during abstinence, 
participants were as distressed as the average psychiatric outpatient was.   
Adult smokers frequently report symptoms reflective of mood and 
anxiety disorders, such as irritability, low mood, restlessness, and difficulty 
concentrating (Breslau, Kilbey, & Andreski, 1992; Madden et al., 1997).  
Madden et al. identified three major classes of withdrawal severity among their 
participants; these were labelled the “mild”, “moderate”, and “severe” groups. 
The symptoms that participants experienced following nicotine deprivation were 
overall very similar to those reported by Hughes and Hatsukami (1986). 
However, compared to smokers with mild nicotine withdrawal, individuals 
having either moderate or severe withdrawal had significantly elevated lifetime 
rates for the indicators of nicotine dependence (as measured by the Fagerström 
Test for Nicotine Dependence: Heatherton, Kozlowski, Frecker, & Fagerström, 
1991). 
The similar prevalence rates across the previous studies (both among 
adolescent and adult smokers) hold despite the use of different measures and the 
different sample characteristics in terms of gender, age, and nationality.  With 
the exception of the study by Hughes and Hatsukami (1986), where observer 
reports of the participants’ withdrawal symptoms were obtained, all of the other  
 
31 
 
studies are possibly limited by their reliance on self-reported withdrawal 
symptoms.  However, objective changes that parallel self-reported withdrawal 
symptoms were documented in laboratory experiments (Hatsukami et al., 1985). 
Furthermore, results from prospective studies (Dozois, Farrow, & Miser, 1995; 
Smith et al., 1996) provided support for most self-reported withdrawal 
symptoms. Finally, the general comparability of findings across the previous 
studies supports the validity of the self-reported retrospective accounts of 
withdrawal.   
Withdrawal symptoms are attributed to nicotine, rather than to 
behavioural aspects of tobacco use, because withdrawal symptoms can be 
alleviated by nicotine replacement (Jarvis, Raw, Russell, & Feyer-Abend, 1992: 
Smith et al., 1996) but not placebo (Russell, Stapleton, Feyerbend, Wiseman, & 
Gustavsson, 1993). 
1.4  Indirect Reinforcing Properties of Nicotine  
Although accumulated evidence indicates that nicotine is the component 
of tobacco smoke that leads to addiction (Stolerman & Jarvis, 1995), the means 
by which nicotine produces addiction remain unclear (Epping-Jordan, Watkins, 
Koob, & Markou., 1998). Two models of “direct” reinforcement have been put 
forward to explain the development and maintenance of addiction. According to 
the positive reinforcement model, drugs are self-administered because they 
induce pleasure or positive affect. On the other hand, according to the negative 
reinforcement model of addiction, drugs are self-administered because of the 
state they alleviate, for example, aversive symptoms associated with withdrawal.  
However, there is a third possibility of an “indirect” action of nicotine on other 
types of rewards. Thus, nicotine may support drug-seeking behaviour because it  
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of efferents is known as the mesolimbic DA system. The DA cells in the medial 
VTA that innervate the medial prefrontal cortex are known as the mesocortical 
DA system. There is considerable overlap between the VTA cells that project to 
these various targets. The two systems are often collectively referred to as the 
mesocorticolimbic DA system (Civelli, 1995). 
Two-deoxyglucose autoradiography showed that the VTA is one of the 
chief regions metabolically activated during ICSS of dopaminergic pathways 
(Yadin, Guarini, & Gallistel, 1983).  Electrodes planted directly or near the 
VTA elicited ICSS (Wise & Rompre, 1989). Stimulation of rewarding sites in 
the VTA augmented DA release in the nucleus accumbens (Fiorino, Coury, 
Fibiger, & Phillips, 1993). Furthermore, destruction of the mesoaccumbens 
projections by neurotoxic diminished the potency of VTA electrodes to elicit 
ICSS (Fibiger, LePiane, Jakubovic, & Phillips, 1987). DA antagonists and 
compounds that interfere with DA synthesis and storage (e.g., reserpine) mimic 
the effects of decreasing the intensity of rewarding brain stimulation (for a 
review, see Wise, 1996). Results from early studies did not make clear whether 
reduction in ICSS behaviour is due to a disruption of reward mechanisms or due 
to deficits in performance caused by motor impairment, or both. Many 
compounds exert motoric effects that might strongly influence an animal’s bar-
pressing ability (Gerhardt & Liebman, 1981). Furthermore, disruption to the 
nigrostriatal DA pathway can cause motor deficits that may render animals 
incapable of producing the movements required to obtain a rewarding stimulus 
(Dews & Morse, 1961). Consequently, researchers devised several paradigms 
that can dissociate motor deficits from alterations in reward intensity (e.g., Bird 
& Kornetsky, 1990; Esposito, Faulkner, & Kornetsky, 1979; Esposito, Perry, &  
 
38 
 
Kornetsky, 1980; Gallistel & Karras, 1984; Miliaressis, Rompre, Laviolette, 
Philippe, & Coulombe, 1986; Sinden & Atrens, 1982; Zarevics & Setler, 1979). 
Results provided further support to the theory that the mesocorticolimbic DA 
system is at least one of the brain pathways mediating the rewarding effects of 
ICSS.  
Many studies demonstrated the effects of nicotine on ICSS. Thus, 
repeated daily injections of nicotine on the VTA of rats lowered the threshold 
for rewarding brain stimulation (Bauco & Wise, 1994; Bespalov et al., 1999; 
Huston-Lyons & Kornetsky, 1992; Huston-Lyons et al., 1993; Ivanova & 
Greenshaw, 1997; Kenny & Markou, 2006). This effect of nicotine was blocked 
by the DA receptor antagonist naloxone, haloperidol, and pimozide and the 
nicotine antagonist mecamylamine (Carboni, Bortone, Giua, & Di Chiara, 2000; 
Huston-Lyons et al., 1993; Ivanova & Greenshaw, 1997). These reward-
enhancing actions of nicotine are mediated by changes in DA transmission in 
the shell sub-region of the nucleus accumbens (Pontieri et al., 1996). 
Specifically, nicotine increases DA levels in the nucleus accumbens (Benwell & 
Balfour, 1992). That mechanism of action is similar to that of cocaine, 
amphetamine, and morphine (Huston-Lyons et al., 1993; Pontieri et al., 1996) as 
well as to that of natural reinforcers, for example, food and water (Fibiger, 
Nomikos, Pfaus, & Damsma, 1992).  
Thus, studies using in vivo microdialysis (measurement of 
neurotransmitters in the extracellular fluid of specific brain regions) showed that 
ingestion of food, water, and sweet solutions (i.e., primary reinforcers) was 
accompanied by increases in extracellular DA concentrations in the nucleus 
accumbens (Fibiger et al., 1992). This finding reflects the activation of the VTA  
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DA may play an important role in learning about stimuli predictive of 
reward. For example, DA neurons in the VTA fired in response to both primary 
and conditioned reinforcers (Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1996). That is, DA cells 
increased their firing when a monkey was given some juice (US) and after 
hearing a sound (CS) that was followed by the juice. In contrast, DA cells did 
not increase their firing when a conditioned stimulus came on (light) that was 
followed by an irritating puff of air (i.e., an aversive stimulus). Therefore, 
midbrain DA neurons may code both natural rewards and environmental cues 
that signal reward, but they are unlikely to code learned aversive stimuli 
(Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1996).  In humans, anticipation of increasing monetary 
rewards elicited nucleus accumbens activation (i.e., DA release) but anticipation 
of increasing punishment did not (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001). 
In monkeys, midbrain DA neurons elicited a short-latency burst of firing 
in response to unpredicted rewards (e.g., small quantity of fruit juice to the 
mouth; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). After repeated pairings of a cue, 
for example, a tone (CS), with reward, the CS comes to predict reward. DA 
neuronal firing now occurs in response to the predictor (CS). Reward itself does 
not activate the neurons. However, if the reward fails to occur, then 
dopaminergic activity is depressed at exactly the time of the expected reward; 
hence, reporting an error in the prediction of reward.  Midbrain DA activity 
codes for expectations about external stimuli or reward, and it codes for errors 
between predictors and actual reward timing and magnitude (Schultz, Tremblay, 
& Hollerman, 1998).  Moreover, DA release occurs more robustly in the nucleus 
accumbens during reward anticipation than during reward consumption 
(Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999).  
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The DA system, which is critical for reward function, becomes 
increasingly responsive to reward predictors and seemingly unresponsive to the 
reward “itself” (Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1996; Schultz et al., 1997, 1998). This 
raises the question whether DA is important for the prediction, rather than the 
“receipt”, of reward. Although Wise (2002) acknowledged the fuzziness of the 
distinction between receipt and prediction of reward, he argued that what might 
tend to be designated as the receipt of reward might more accurately be 
designated as a more proximal predictor of reward. He suggested that in the 
human situation (e.g., the excitement of winning the lottery), reward is 
experienced upon announcement of the winning number rather than at the 
receipt of the food that the money eventually buys. Thus, although money is a 
reward, it is a conditioned reward, not a primary one. Money is a reward 
because it is associated with things to come (e.g., food, bigger house, better car). 
It follows that stimuli that predict reward (CS) should activate the DA system as 
much as, if not more than, unconditioned rewards do (Wise, 2002).  
Conditioned reinforcers (for food) increased the release of DA in the 
nucleus accumbens, whereas DA-depleting lesions of the nucleus accumbens 
attenuated the effect of conditioned (learned) incentives on behaviour (Robbins, 
Cador, Taylor, & Everitt, 1989). Taylor and Robbins (1984) examined the 
enhancement of conditioned reinforcement following microinfusions of d-
amphetamine into the nucleus accumbens of rats. They found that d-
amphetamine produced a significant dose-dependent increase in responding on 
the CR lever (presentation of light previously paired with food). There was no 
significant increase in responding on the NCR lever (no programmed 
consequences). Therefore, the enhancement of responding for a CS (i.e., light)  
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therefore behaviour maintained by, an already reinforcing nonpharmacological 
stimulus through nonassociative mechanisms (Donny et al., 2003). Associating 
nicotine with the visual stimulus produced a synergistic and not just an additive 
enhancement of self-administration. That is, response rates generated by the 
combination of visual stimulus and nicotine were more than twice the sum of 
response rates produced by the visual stimulus alone or nicotine alone. 
Furthermore, unlike nicotine, noncontingent delivery of food pellets did not 
enhance responding for the visual stimulus compared to lever pressing for the 
visual stimulus alone. Therefore, the increase in response rates was a direct, 
pharmacological action of nicotine and not a property of all reinforcers (Donny 
et al., 2003). 
In addition to unconditioned reinforcing stimuli, nicotine can also 
enhance behaviour maintained by conditioned reinforcers. For instance, a brief 
tone-light stimulus was paired or not with sucrose pallets. After training, two 
separate levers were introduced. Responding on one lever was reinforced by the 
stimulus in the absence of sucrose. Animals with sucrose-paired training 
responded considerably more on the stimulus-reinforced lever compared to the 
nonreinforced lever or to rats in the sucrose-unpaired condition. Therefore, the 
paired stimulus became a conditioned reinforcer, whereas the unpaired stimulus 
had only weak reinforcing strength. Subsequently, animals were divided into 
three groups and were tested daily on a progressive-ratio reinforcement 
schedule. Lever pressing was reinforced by the stimulus with contingent 
nicotine, noncontingent nicotine, and noncontingent saline. Rats with sucrose-
unpaired training demonstrated moderate responding for the stimulus (with 
saline) compared to rats with sucrose-paired training that responded at a  
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significantly greater level for the stimulus (with saline). Therefore, prior pairing 
of the stimulus with sucrose made it a comparatively stronger positive 
reinforcer. More important, contingent nicotine elevated responding for the 
stimulus equally in the sucrose-unpaired and sucrose-paired groups. 
Noncontingent nicotine more effectively increased responding for the sucrose-
paired as opposed to the sucrose-unpaired stimulus (Chaudhri, 2005). Thus, if 
the nonpharmacological stimulus possesses some reinforcing strength prior to 
nicotine exposure, then the reinforcement-enhancing effect of nicotine (assessed 
using noncontingent nicotine) is pronounced (Chaudhri et al., 2005). The 
evidence that noncontingent nicotine can enhance responding for unconditioned 
as well as conditioned reinforcing stimuli provides further support for the 
reinforcement-enhancing actions of nicotine 
Furthermore, in animal studies, nicotine increased motivation to obtain 
food (Popke, Mayorga, Fogle, & Paule, 2000) and potentiated alcohol and 
cocaine self-administration (Clark, Lindgren, Brooks, Watson, & Little, 2001). 
Likewise, in humans, smoking often occurs in conjunction with other reinforced 
behaviour (e.g. drinking alcohol; Bien & Burge, 1990). Although these effects 
are often interpreted as being pharmacologically specific (e.g., nicotine-alcohol 
interactions), an alternative interpretation is that nicotine acts more broadly, 
potentiating the effects of reinforcing stimuli. Consistent with that, 
neurophysiological evidence suggests that nicotine has a more general effect: 
The net GABAergic and glutamatergic influence on brain DA systems may shift 
towards a more excitable state following nicotine exposure (Mansvelder, Keath, 
& McGehee, 2002).   
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with increases in neuronal activity in a distributed system of brain regions 
congruent with DA circuitry, including the nucleus accumbens (Stein et al., 
1998).  In a later study, Positron Emission Tomography (PET) techniques were 
used to study DA activity in smoking and nonsmoking human participants in 
vivo. DA activity was significantly higher in smokers compared to nonsmokers 
(Salokangas et al., 2000). Finally, PET was used to determine the binding 
potential (an indirect measure of DA release) in the ventral striatum regions 
(including nucleus accumbens) of nicotine dependent participants (10 smoked a 
cigarette and 10 did not). The group that smoked had greater reductions in 
receptor binding potential (indicative of increased DA release) in the ventral 
striatum compared to the group that did not smoke. The magnitude of the 
binding potential was comparable to that found in studies that used similar 
methods to examine the effects of other addictive drugs (Brody et al., 2004). 
Thus, nicotine increases DA levels in the nucleus accumbens of human 
smokers. This effect of nicotine is mediated through activation of acetylcholine 
receptors (Paterson & Nordberg, 2000). Nicotine is an agonist at the nicotine 
acetylcholine receptors (nAChRs) located in the VTA, and nicotine induces DA 
release partly by binding directly to nAChRs located in the mesolimbic DA 
system, especially within the VTA (Nisell, Nomikos, & Svensson, 1994). Thus, 
although direct infusions of nicotine in the VTA produced a long lasting 
increase in DA release in the nucleus accumbens (Nisell et al., 1994), infusion 
of a nAChR antagonist (dihydro-β-erythroidine) directly into the VTA produced 
a significant decrease in nicotine self-administration behaviour (Corrigal, 
Cohen, & Adamson, 1994). Similarly, administration of the nAChR antagonist 
mecamylamine blocked nicotine self-administration in the rat, indicating that  
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monetary reward with a baseline condition in which nonsense feedback was 
presented. Regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) was measured while 
participants performed a pre-learned pattern recognition task. Monetary reward, 
but not nonmonetary reward, activated typical dopaminergic regions, such as the 
striatum, in nonsmokers but not in smokers. Smokers did not exhibit increased 
rCBF in the striatum in either the monetary or nonmonetary reward conditions 
(Martin-Sölch et al., 2001). These results were replicated in a later study 
(Martin-Soelch, Missimer, Leenders, & Schultz, 2003). The different patterns of 
activation suggested that brain dopaminergic regions might be underactive in 
smokers probably because of tobacco smoking (Martin-Sölch et al., 2001). The 
results of these studies (Dagher et al., 2001; Martin-Soelch et al., 2003; Martin-
Sölch et al., 2001) led the authors to conclude that the reinforcing effects of 
drugs during self-administration create an environment that, if perpetuated, 
triggers the neuronal adaptations that result in addiction. Therefore, addiction 
results from the repeated perturbation of brain reward circuitries―marked 
increases in DA during drug administration followed by marked DA decreases 
during drug withdrawal. This results in disruption of DA function and a 
concomitant disruption in ability to respond to rewards. If the development of 
addiction is accompanied by a disruption in the ability to experience reward, 
then highly dependent smokers might be less able to experience reward 
compared with less dependent smokers. However, as yet, there are no studies 
comparing responsivity to reward in highly dependent and less dependent 
smokers. One objective of the current thesis was to make this comparison in 
order to further examine the argument that increasing levels of dependency are  
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     expectancies are developed, frequently through simple contiguity (p. 306). 
Thus, reward usually governs normal behaviour through pleasurable experiences 
(Bozarth, 1994). Pleasure is defined as “The condition or sensation induced by 
the experience or anticipation of what is felt to be good or desirable, a feeling of 
happy satisfaction or enjoyment, delight, sensual or sexual gratification; 
opposed to pain” (Soanes & Stevenson, 2005). However, Snaith (1993) pointed 
out that, “Pleasure, like happiness, is impossible to define because every person 
will have their own concept of experience” (p. 958). In addition, Feibelman 
(1964) wrote: 
     Pleasure is generally recognised as a quality and qualities are impossible to 
     describe; they are intelligible only to those who have experienced them.  All 
     we can hope to achieve is to tag the quality and describe the nature of its  
     associations. (p. 257)  
Thus, pleasure is a subjective phenomenon or quality that has been 
associated with rewarding activities.  Pleasure is a competence or function of the 
reward circuitries. Pleasure and reward systems share common mechanisms and 
morphological structures; thus, pleasure and reward circuitry are biologically 
interconnected (Esch & Stefano, 2004). However, other investigators do not 
regard the subjective state of pleasure as the basis of reinforcement (e.g., 
Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Tiffany & Carter, 1998).  
Many investigators argue that the DA system, which arises from cell 
groups located in the VTA of the midbrain and has projections throughout the 
cortex, is a key player in positive emotional states and reward responsivity.  
Mesolimbic DA projections from the VTA of the brain to reward-related 
regions, such as the ventral striatum, the amygdale, and the orbitofrontal cortex,  
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support a system critical to pleasant mood and reward-related behaviour 
(Spanagel & Weiss, 1999). In humans, the pleasurable or euphoric effects of 
certain addictive drugs (e.g., heroin, cocaine, and nicotine) are renowned. These 
drugs produce their rewarding effects by increasing DA levels. Thus, 
investigators examined the relationship between subjective emotional 
experience and DA release induced by administration of psychostimulant drugs 
(Drevets et al., 2001; Stein et al., 1998; Volkow et al., 1999).  
PET was used to correlate the change in endogenous DA concentrations 
following intravenous dextroamphetamine (AMPH) administration (0.3 mg/kg) 
with the associated affective response in healthy human participants. The 
magnitude of the DA release produced by administration of AMPH correlated 
positively with the affective (euphoric) responses to AMPH (Drevets et al., 
2001). PET was also used to measure changes in brain DA after different doses 
of intravenous methylphenidate (MP), a cocaine-like psychostimulant, in 14 
healthy participants. Furthermore, the relationship between self-reported drug 
effects and MP-induced changes in brain DA was assessed. The intensity of the 
high induced by MP significantly correlated with the levels of released DA. 
Thus, participants who had the greatest increases were those who perceived the 
most intense high. Furthermore, participants for whom MP did not increase DA 
did not perceive a high (Volkow et al., 1999).  
In an fMRI study, intravenous nicotine in 16 active cigarette smokers 
induced a dose-dependent increase in neuronal activity in a distributed system of 
brain regions congruent with DA circuitry (including the nucleus accumbens, 
amygdala, and frontal lobes). In addition, nicotine administration induced a 
dose-dependent increase in self-reported feelings of high, rush, and drug liking  
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(Stein et al., 1998). Moreover, PET was used to assess the binding potential, and 
thus release of DA, in the ventral striatum in 10 smokers. Participants were 
tested twice on separate days. In one condition, participants smoked their usual 
brand of cigarettes while in the scanner; in the other condition, they remained 
nicotine abstinent. On each day, participants monitored the hedonic properties of 
their experience, that is, elation and euphoria. Smoking produced a reduction in 
receptor binding potential in the ventral striatum (which is proportional to the 
increase in DA release), and it produced euphoria and elation. Among 
participants experiencing an increase in elation/euphoria in response to smoking, 
there was a significant (21.3%) decrease in binding potential. Thus, pleasurable 
drug experiences were associated with increased DA transmission in the 
striatum (Barrett et al., 2004).   
Similar results were reported with alcohol too. That is, nucleus 
accumbens dopaminergic function correlated with ratings of intoxication and 
high (Yoder et al., 2005). These results represent clear demonstrations that drug-
induced high, a mood descriptor that reflects reinforcing/rewarding effects of 
drugs in humans, is associated with increases in brain DA and that there is a 
quantitative relationship between levels of DA release and the intensity of the 
high.  
The dopaminergic system is associated with the incentive aspect of 
rewards; that is, it underlies the affective change produced by rewards typically 
experienced as an increase in pleasure or positive affect (Di Chiara & North, 
1992). In addition, enhanced DA release in the nucleus accumbens underlies 
responsiveness to incentive or “reward responsivity” (Salamone, 1994). In other 
words, DA release underlies both the capacity to experience pleasure associated  
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In the animal model of anhedonia, researchers employed the intracranial 
self-stimulation (ICSS; Olds & Milner, 1954) procedure to measure brain 
reward thresholds (see Section 1.4.1). Results showed that decreased function of 
reward systems or anhedonia is a common element of withdrawal from chronic 
administration of several classes of abused drugs, including nicotine (e.g., 
Epping-Jordan et al., 1998). Because anhedonia, or decreased reward 
responsivity, is also a main feature of depression (Henriques & Davinson, 
2000), investigators suggested that nicotine withdrawal precipitates 
symptomatology similar to depression (Markou et al., 1998; Markou & Kenny, 
2002). Depressed smokers may use nicotine in an attempt to self-medicate the 
underlying lack of positive affect present in depression (Markou et al., 1998). 
Crucially, withdrawal enhances the incentive value of the drug and suppresses 
the incentive value of nondrug stimuli (Harrison, Liem, & Markou, 2001).  
Thus, withdrawal, like clinical depression, produces diminished interest and 
pleasure in response to a variety of rewarding stimuli probably because 
withdrawal elevates thresholds for incentive processing (Harrison et al., 2001). 
Self-administration of the drug will not only ameliorate aversive withdrawal 
symptoms; it will also restore the incentive value of nonpharmacological 
incentives (Baker et al., 2004). As Baker et al. (2004) put it, “Drug self-
administration fills the world with potential reinforcers” (p. 44). 
The anhedonia associated with nicotine withdrawal is related to reduced 
DA release in the mesocorticolimbic system (Salamone, 1994). Following a 
period of constant exposure to nicotine, DA neurons in the nucleus accumbens 
may become dependent upon nicotine to maintain normal levels of activity. 
Reductions in plasma nicotine concentration after a period of chronic exposure  
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may result in decreased DA function; thus, decreased sensitivity of reward 
circuits to stimulation by natural rewards. As Everitt (1992) stated, “DA makes 
the world a brighter place” (as cited in Robinson & Berridge, 1993, p. 262). 
Decreased DA function and the concomitant decrease in reward sensitivity 
during withdrawal might be synonymous to an anhedonic state (i.e., depressed 
mood and lack of motivation) that smokers might seek to avoid by continuing to 
smoke. In fact, anhedonia is an important factor involved in the transition from 
recreational drug use to excessive drug taking (Ahmed & Koob, 1998) and in 
relapse (Koob & Le Moal, 2005; Volkow, Fowler, Wang, & Goldstein, 2002). 
In support of these claims, anhedonic smokers (i.e., those with chronically low 
positive affect) reported a greater increase in craving during nicotine withdrawal 
than less anhedonic smokers did (Cook, Spring, McChargue, & Hedeker, 2004). 
Furthermore, anhedonia was associated with decreased abstinence; therefore, it 
was implicated indirectly in smoking cessation failure (Al’Absi, Hatsukami, 
Davis, & Wittmers, 2004). On the other hand, high levels of positive affect at 
baseline predicted greater likelihood of abstinence (Doran et al., 2006). 
Anhedonia, as a major symptom of nicotine withdrawal, is also a 
symptom of nicotine dependence. Chronic smokers are at risk for the 
development of depressive symptoms (or anhedonia) as a result of the 
neuroadaptations brought about by chronic nicotine use (Balfour & Ridley, 
2000). Koob and Le Moal (1997, 2001, 2005), in a modification on Solomon 
and Corbit’s (1974, 1977) opponent-process theory, suggested that dependence 
may involve a change in hedonic set point that includes decreased function of 
brain reward systems and recruitment of anti-reward systems that drive aversive 
emotional states (Koob & Le Moal, 2005). Acutely, nicotine produces a reward- 
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facilitating effect and a mood-elevating effect through its actions on brain DA 
and other neurotransmitter systems. These effects would be followed by 
opposing reactions that would tend to slowly return the system to the initial level 
of hedonic responsivity (Koob, 1996). However, with continued increased drug 
administration the opponent process would fail to return the system to its 
homeostatic level before drug taking would begin again, thereby gradually 
decreasing brain reward function and increasing subjective negative affect 
(Koob & Le Moal, 2005). As a result, increased nicotine intake would be 
required to reach the desired level of stimulation. The neuroadaptations 
proposed to occur with chronic nicotine use would manifest during abstinence as 
decreased reward function and increased negative affective consequences; thus, 
contributing to the maintenance of nicotine dependence (Ahmed & Koob, 1998; 
Koob & Le Moal, 1997, 2001, 2005). Over time, a new level of low reward 
responsivity and high negative affect would represent an allostatic state (Koob 
& Le Moal, 1997, 2001); that is, a chronic deviation of the reward system from 
its normal (homeostatic) operating level. This suggests that drug administration 
would not return the system to its initial homeostatic level. Therefore, it is 
possible that smokers would be constantly in some form of withdrawal; in other 
words, they would be constantly in a state of decreased brain reward function 
and increased negative mood. These disturbances would become larger with 
increased nicotine consumption and dependence. In fact, a dose-response 
relationship was found: Affective distress was associated more with heavy 
smoking and nicotine dependence and less so with intermittent or nondependent 
smoking (Breslau, Kilbey, & Andreski, 1994).   
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They predicted that chronic smokers would show increased reward responsivity 
immediately after smoking relative to during abstinence. They assessed a sample 
of smokers during a period of voluntary acute abstinence observed for religious 
reasons (Ramadan) and then immediately after they had smoked a cigarette at 
the end of this abstinence period. Smokers showed significantly lower reward 
responsivity on the CARROT when they were tested after 6 hours of abstinence 
(Group DAYQUIT) and after at least 10 days of abstinence (RAMQUIT) than 
when they were tested after smoking. In addition, smokers showed significantly 
lower reward responsivity than a comparable group of nonsmokers. Baseline 
psychomotor speed did not differ between conditions or groups. 
The authors suggested that, when nicotine-deprived, endogenous DA 
function in smokers is downregulated. This might render them less able to 
respond to incentives in the normal way and result in suboptimal performance 
on tests subserved by central DA activity. The acute effect of smoking may be to 
stimulate DA activity to higher levels; therefore, improve performance on these 
tasks. These findings potentially have the important clinical implication that 
when smokers initially quit, they may experience diminished responsiveness to 
other environmental sources of pleasure or reward. The consequent 
psychological state of being poorly motivated to engage in other enjoyable 
activities could elevate the likelihood of relapse. 
Although in the Al-Adawi and Powell study (1997) the DAYQUIT and 
RAMQUIT participants did not differ in reward responsivity when they were 
satiated, the RAMQUIT group rated themselves as significantly less dependent. 
They reported that they gained less stimulation from smoking than did the 
DAYQUIT group. This may suggest that smokers have low levels of  
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arousal and thus on attentional processes. This could indirectly lead to 
improvement in card-sorting performance over the series of the CARROT trials 
merely through practice (i.e., in the absence of any changes in reinforcement 
contingencies). In his early work, Thorndike (1911) distinguished between 
effect (reinforcement) and exercise (practice), regarding both factors as 
important but independent. The methodologies of the studies that used the 
CARROT (e.g., Al-Adawi & Powell, 1997; Powell et al., 2002), described in 
detail elsewhere (see Section 2.1.3.1), do not allow us to distinguish between 
practice effects and the effects of nicotine withdrawal on reward.  
 In the CARROT, participants have to sort cards under one of two 
conditions: with and without reward. In the reward condition, a small amount of 
money is earned for every card sorted. This typically increases sorting speed. 
Al-Adawi and Powell (1997) found that withdrawal decreased reward 
responsivity. This finding was later replicated (Powell et al., 2002).  
In published studies, the CARROT measure of reward responsivity was 
based on the difference in performance between rewarded and nonrewarded 
trials when a rewarded trial was placed between two nonrewarded trials in a 
series of three trials (Al-Adawi & Powell, 1997; Powell et al., 2002). Although 
these experiments included a practice trial before the three-trial series, it is 
nevertheless possible that performance was still improving across these trials as 
a result of continued practice. Moreover, practice may have had different effects 
under conditions of withdrawal and satiation (e.g., see Chapter 7 and Section 
9.1.2). Thus, an apparent effect of withdrawal on performance across the trial 
series that make up the CARROT could be the result in differences in the 
amount of improvement between adjacent trials in the three-trial sequence. For  
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example, suppose that―as a result of practice alone―card-sorting rate reached 
an asymptote more slowly under withdrawal than under satiation. This could 
produce an apparent effect of withdrawal on reward responsivity when it was 
measured using as a difference score as described above.  
To remove this potential confound, the research reported in the present 
thesis used an adaptation of the CARROT that included a counterbalancing 
procedure. This meant that rewarded and nonrewarded trials occurred equally 
often in each position of a two-trial sequence (Study 1) and a four-trial sequence 
(Study 2 and Study 3). This modification allowed us to investigate whether 
withdrawal might have an indirect effect on CARROT performance independent 
of reward. 
Furthermore, the studies by Powell and colleagues (i.e., Al-Adawi & 
Powell, 1997; Powell et al., 2002) did not illuminate either the aetiology or the 
time course of the observed deficits during smoking abstinence. It is possible 
that, in habitual smokers, nicotine reverses deficits, which are the result of 
neuroadapations that have taken place over the period of chronic smoking (e.g., 
Fowler et al., 1996). Alternatively, these deficits may be the result of 
neuroadapations that antedated the initiation of smoking and potentially acted as 
vulnerability factors for nicotine use (Volkow, Fowler, Wang, & Goldstein, 
2002; Volkow et al., 1999). These issues have yet to be examined.  
It is possible that the reward responsivity deficit seen in abstinent 
smokers during withdrawal preceded the onset of regular smoking; that is, it 
represents a constitutional dopaminergic deficit. This might have increased the 
risk for regular smoking in the first place. In this case, nicotine may have 
possible clinical uses. Nicotinic agents with reduced toxicity and few side  
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effects could be developed to treat motivational deficits. Such nicotinic agents 
could prevent people from taking up smoking as a means of self-medication 
because, in most cases, taking up smoking eventually leads to loss of the 
voluntary ability to control its use. On the other hand, the reward deficit seen in 
abstinent smokers may reflect a dopaminergic neuroadaptation “unmasked” 
during nicotine withdrawal. If so, then it would be crucial to establish the point 
in time when this neuroadaptation begins developing and ultimately “usurps” 
normal behaviour and motivational processes. If the onset of dependence occurs 
when avoidance or relief of withdrawal motivates drug-taking behaviour, then 
drug use before this point in time might be targeted by dependence-prevention 
interventions, whereas drug use after this point might require pharmacological 
treatment. 
Therefore, the next step in this line of research would be to extend the 
findings of Powell and colleagues (e.g., Al-Adawi & Powell, 1997; Powell et 
al., 2002) by (a) using a modified version of the CARROT where the 
presentation of the rewarded and nonrewarded trials is counterbalanced in order 
to control for possible practice effects and (b) by investigating the differences in 
reward responsivity between high and low dependence participants in an attempt 
to establish the point when recreational tobacco use becomes compulsive. Based 
on the findings of Epping-Jordan et al. (1998) and Powell and colleagues it was 
hypothesised that: 
a.  There would be a main effect of smoking status on reward   
       responsivity (measured behaviourally).  Satiated smokers would   
       have higher reward responsivity scores compared to abstinent  
       smokers.  
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b.  There would be an interaction effect.  If highly dependent smokers     
                   experienced more severe withdrawal compared to low dependence 
 smokers, then there would be a greater difference in reward    
 responsivity (measured behaviourally) in satiation and withdrawal  
 for the highly dependent participants. 
Furthermore, given the complex relationship between reward sensitivity 
and affect and the fact that both are compromised during nicotine withdrawal 
(Hughes & Hatsukami, 1986; Powell et al., 2002) and dependence (Koob & Le 
Moal, 2005), the effects of nicotine withdrawal and dependence on reward 
responsivity and affect were examined simultaneously (see chapter 8). To my 
knowledge, this has not been done before. It was hypothesised that: 
c.  There would be a main effect of smoking status on reward sensitivity 
(measured subjectively), positive affect, and negative affect.  Satiated 
smokers would have higher reward responsivity scores, higher 
positive affect scores, and lower negative affect scores compared to 
abstinent smokers. 
d.  There would be an interaction effect.  If highly dependent smokers     
experienced more severe withdrawal compared to low dependence 
smokers, then there would be a greater difference in reward 
sensitivity (measured subjectively), positive affect, and negative 
affect in satiation and withdrawal for the highly dependent 
participants. 
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Researchers measure ECO levels using a breath CO monitor. The 
monitor is standardized and calibrated against a control gas as recommended by 
the manufacturer. Participants are asked to inhale deeply, hold their breath for 
15 seconds, and then to exhale slowly into a mouthpiece connected to the 
smokerlyzer aiming to empty their lungs. Once a sufficient sample is obtained, 
the smokerlyzer shows a “parts per million” (ppm) ECO reading.  
The half-life of CO is about 2 to 5 hours (Powell et al., 2002). Thus, 
there is a marked difference between the ECO levels of smokers who just 
smoked compared to smokers who remained abstinent for more than 6 hours. 
ECO levels are measured at the beginning of each test session. Typically, the 
difference in ECO levels between satiation and after overnight abstinence is 
significant (Powell et al., 2002; Powell et al., 2004; Richardson et al., 2003; 
Smolka, Budde, Karow, & Schmidt, 2004; Zinser et al., 1992). 
Investigators consider ECO values equal to or greater than 10 ppm to be 
an indicator of recent smoking (Attebring, Herlitz, Berndt, Karlsson, & 
Hjalmarson, 2001) and commonly accept them as cut-off points in the literature 
(Hogle & Curtin, 2006; Powell et al., 2004; Ruth & Neaton, 1991; Smith et al., 
2003). However, some investigators used cut-off points of 15 ppm (Hutchinson, 
LaChance, Niaura, Bryan, & Smolen, 2002; Richardson et al., 2003). Some 
others even accepted mean ECO levels during abstinence of 20.7 ppm (Tidey, 
Rohsenow, Kaplan, & Swift, 2005). If individuals live in an environment that is 
not smoke free (e.g., spent the night in a room where they had been smoking), 
then their ECO levels during overnight abstinence may not fall below 10 ppm. 
Therefore, in this research, a cut-off point of 15 ppm was used (except in Study 
1 where a cut-off point of 10ppm was used).  
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participants to several dependence groups (e.g. very low, low, moderate, high, 
and very high dependence; Horn, Fernandes, Dino, Massey, & Kalsekar, 2003). 
However, owing to difficulties in obtaining large samples of highly dependent 
smokers, FTND cut-off points that investigators have used to designate high 
dependence versus low dependence are often at the median or average of the 
sample actually studied (e.g., Al’Absi et al., 2004; Al-Adawi & Powell, 1997). 
Powell et al. (2002) used the FTND to measure level of dependency in their 
sample. In the present research, I aimed to replicate and extend the findings of 
Powell et al. with a modified procedure. Therefore, I used the same dependency 
measure, to allow for direct comparisons. In addition, following other 
investigators (e.g. Al’Absi et al., 2004; Al-Adawi & Powell, 1997; Powell et al., 
2002), in order to compare different levels of dependence in my sample, I 
defined smokers with FTND scores of ≤ 3 as low dependence and the remainder 
as high dependence (see Section 2.2). The FTND cut-off score of 3 was based 
on the median score of the sample recruited in Study 1. Thus, dependence was 
considered as a two-level factor in the Analyses of Variance that were used for 
the main analyses throughout the thesis. 
The FTND is significantly associated with several independent self-
report and biochemical indicators of nicotine dependence in the expected 
direction. Thus, the FTND was significantly related to the number of years 
smoked (Burling & Burling, 2003; Haddock, Lando, Klesges, Talcott, & 
Renaud, 1999; John et al., 2003; Pomerleau, Carton, Lutzke, Fressland, & 
Pomerleau, 1994), to age of smoking onset (Burling & Burling, 2003), and to 
number of smoking-related physical symptoms (i.e., coughing, shortness of 
breath, chest pain, being easily tired out, headaches, and problems with sense of  
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smell and taste; Burling & Burling, 2003). It was also related to cigarette brand. 
That is, smokers of regular brand cigarettes had higher nicotine dependence 
scores compared to those who preferred light, ultra-light, or had no usual brand 
(Haddock et al., 1999). Furthermore, the FTND was related to the Smoking 
Withdrawal Questionnaire (SWQ; Shiffman & Jarvik, 1976) on the 
craving/addiction subscale (Buckley et al., 2005) and to biochemical markers of 
nicotine, such as expired breath carbon monoxide (Buckley et al., 2005; Burling 
& Burling, 2003; Yang, McEvoy, Wilson, Levin, & Rose, 2003) and cotinine 
levels (Burling & Burling, 2003). The FTND was also associated with achieving 
short-time smoking cessation (i.e., biochemically verified continuous abstinence 
for at least 4 weeks postquit; Burling & Burling, 2003). It was found to be 
predictive of self-reported 48-hours quit attempts (Bobo, Lando, Walker, & 
McIlvain, 1996), of smoking cessation at 1-year follow-up assessments 
(Haddock et al., 1999), and of long-term (i.e., 2 years) smoking abstinence 
(Breslau & Johnson, 2000).  
Internal consistency (i.e., the coefficient of test scores or, put more 
simply, the consistency of results across items within a single test) of the FTND 
was reported to be reasonable for a six-item measure (a = .56 - .68; Heatherton 
et al., 1991; Payne et al., 1994; Pomerleau et al., 1994). High FTND test-retest 
correlations were reported in a number of studies:  .85 in a French sample (Etter, 
Duc, & Permeger, 1999), .88 in an American sample (Pomerleau et al, 1994), 
.78 in a study of schizophrenic smokers (Yang et al., 2003), and .82 in a study of 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder smokers (Buckley et al., 2005). The FTND was 
used to estimate the accuracy of retrospective reports of dependence (Hudmon, 
Pomerleau, Brigham, Javitz, & Swan, 2005; Vink, Willemsen, Beem, &  
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The original or full version of this task involves four trials (Trial 1 [T1] 
= Baseline, Trial 2 [T2] = Nonrewarded trial, Trial 3 [T3] = Rewarded trial, 
Trial 4 [T4] = Nonrewarded trial) performed with just a brief rest period 
between each. After a short practice trial where participants familiarise 
themselves with the cards, the first trial (Baseline) is used to establish baseline 
speed for sorting exactly 60 cards. The CARROT was first used with brain-
injured patients who are slow to initiate or respond (Powell et al., 1996). Thus, 
the purpose of the baseline trial (T1) was to “allow subsequent trial times to be 
adjusted to control for any sensory, motor, or cognitive deficits, which reduce 
baseline speed” (p. 418). However, it is not clear whether the baseline trial (T1) 
would be necessary when examining responsiveness to small financial incentive 
in a sample of healthy participants. Nevertheless, the individually determined 
time to sort 60 cards in T1 is used as the fixed time limit for the following three 
trials within each of which the number of cards is inexhaustible and the total 
number sorted is recorded. Participants are instructed to sort as quickly and as 
accurately as possible in all trials, but the Rewarded trial (R) differs from the 
Nonrewared trials (N) in that participants are informed that in R they will be 
rewarded with 10 pence for every five cards sorted. Coins are placed on the 
table in full view following every fifth correct card. The average number of 
cards sorted in R indexes rewarded speed, whereas the number of cards sorted in 
the N indexes nonrewarded speed. Number of cards sorted in R can be 
compared either with the average of the two scores for the N trials, that is,  R - 
(N + N) /2, or with just the preceding N trial, that is, R - N, to estimate “reward 
responsivity” (REWRESP), that is, acceleration in sorting rate under reward.  
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Snaith et al. (1995) reported that the SHAPS has good face validity (i.e., 
it looks like it is going to measure what it is supposed to measure). That rests 
upon the wording of its items.  Furthermore, the SHAPS has good content 
validity (i.e., it represents all facets of hedonic tone, or lack of) because it is 
based on a coverage of domains of pleasure (i.e., interest/pastimes, social 
interaction, sensory experience, and food/drink). The convergent validity of the 
SHAPS (i.e., its relation to what it should theoretically be related to) is 
supported by its correlations with the Montgomery Asberg Depression Rating 
Scale (MADRS; Montgomery & Asberg, 1979) Hedonic Tone Item (Gilbert, 
Allan, Brough, Malley, & Miles, 2002) and the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; Franken, Rassin, & 
Muris, in press). Its divergent validity (i.e., its relation to what it should not be 
theoretically related to) is shown by negative correlations between the SHAPS 
and the Behavioural Activation Scale (BAS; Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1987) 
Reward Responsiveness subscale (Franken et al, in press), the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule Scales (PANAS Scales; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) Positive Affect Subscale (Gilbert et al., 2002; Franken et al., in press), 
and the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & 
Griffin, 1985). Furthermore, there was a lack of association between the SHAPS 
and the MADRS Anxiety Items (Snaith et al., 1995). Because anhedonia is 
defined as the absence of pleasurable feelings and not the mere presence of 
aversive emotions, such as anxiety, the lack of association between the SHAPS 
and the MADRS Anxiety Items contributes to the validity of the SHAPS as a 
pure measure of anhedonia (Franken et al., in press). The internal consistency of 
the SHAPS (i.e., consistency of results across items in a single test) was .91 in a  
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In a series of studies, Feldman Barrett and colleagues (Feldman Barrett 
& Russell, 1998; Yik, Russell, & Feldman Barrett, 1999) integrated the four 
different structures of affect (Figure 2.2). When random and nonrandom 
measurement errors (e.g., acquiescence, extreme response style) were taken into 
account and when the adjective checklists used consisted of semantic opposites, 
the two principal dimensions of affect (pleasantness – activation) were bipolar 
and almost fully independent of one another (Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 
1993; Green & Salovey, 1999; Yik et al., 1999). Feldman Barrett and colleagues 
also demonstrated that other affective descriptors (e.g., thrilled, calm, distressed, 
depressed) can be defined as combinations of valence and activation (see Figure 
2.3). In other words, both pleasant and unpleasant affect words vary in the level 
of activation versus deactivation they denote. In addition, words denoting 
activation and deactivation vary in valence. Furthermore, the entire space can be 
thought of as degrees of pleasantness or unpleasantness and as degrees of 
activation or deactivation. However, although there are between 500 and 2,000 
terms in English that have to do with emotion, their position within the affective 
space (Figure 2.3) has not been clearly established (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 
1999).  Nevertheless, each word in the affective space has a bipolar opposite 
180
o away that is opposite on both components. Pairs of orthogonal 
(independent) dimensions also exist: For any dimension placed at an angle, 
another dimension exists, which is 90
o and therefore independent (see Figure 
2.2.b). As Figure 2.2.b shows, the dimensions that Watson and Tellegen (1985) 
picked in the affective space to define Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect 
(NA) are about 90
 o apart in the structure of affect; therefore, they are  
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convergent validity. The PANAS Scales correlated with measures of distress 
and psychopathology, such as the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL; 
Derogatis, Lipman, Rickels, Uhlenhuth, & Covi, 1974), which measures general 
distress and dysfunction, and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 
1961), a self-report measure of depressive symptomatology. For the HSCL, 
correlations with NA ranged from .65 to .74, and correlations with PA ranged 
from -.19 to -.29 across different time frames. For the BDI, correlations with NA 
ranged from .56 to .58, and correlations with PA ranged from -.35 to -.36 across 
different time frames. These findings confirmed the external validity of the 
PANAS Scales. Thus, the PANAS could be used to complement more 
traditional measures of depression with the advantage of providing measures for 
two affective components (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Test-retest 
reliability of the PANAS Scales is acceptable. Two-month retests of the PANAS 
Scales in samples of 502 and 399 undergraduates produced coefficients of .70 
and .64, respectively, for NA and .71 and .59, respectively, for PA (Watson & 
Clark, 1994). Among elderly rehabilitation patients, coefficients for PA and NA 
were .79 and .93, respectively, in a 3-month retest period (Ostir, Smith, Smith, 
& Ottenbacher, 2005).  Watson and Walker (1996) initially assessed participants 
as undergraduates and re-tested those participants 6 to7 years later. Initial scores 
on the PANAS Scales correlated significantly with the PANAS scores obtained 
several years later. Thus, the PANAS Scales were substantially stable even 
across extended time spans (Watson & Walker, 1996). 
Furthermore, researchers identified positive affect and negative affect, as 
measured by the PANAS, across different sets of descriptors and response 
formats and in both within- and between-participants analyses (Watson &  
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appeared to diminish. There were no significant differences between 30 mg 
fluoxetine and placebo. Those in the placebo condition experienced decreases in 
PA levels and increases in NA levels compared to prequit, which persisted for 
more than 3 weeks. The fact that fluoxetine exerted a more sustained influence 
on PA than on NA suggests that these two parameters of affective responses are 
partially independent (Cook, Spring, McChargue, Borrelli, et al., 2004).   
Finally, the PANAS was used to examine the relationship between 
cigarette consumption and affect (Becona, Vasquez, Fuentes, & Lorenzo, 1999). 
Of the 1,615 participants selected randomly from the population, 63.7% were 
nonsmokers (i.e., not smoking within the previous 30 days) and 36.3% were 
smokers. The groups were divided by cigarette consumption as 0 (nonsmoking) 
and 1-15, 16-30, and 31 or more cigarettes/day. Analysis of variance of cigarette 
consumption indicated that there were no significant differences in PA. 
However, there were significant differences in NA between groups 1 to15 
versus 31 or more cigarettes/day. The group smoking 31 or more cigarettes/day 
reported significantly higher NA compared to the group smoking 1 to 15 
cigarettes/day. The results indicated a relationship between cigarette 
consumption and NA in smokers with a consumption of 31 or more cigarettes 
daily (Becona et al., 1999).  
In addition, because the PANAS has good psychometric properties, it 
was used extensively in different lines of smoking research (e.g., Cinciripini et 
al., 2006; Kenford  et al., 2002; McChargue, Cohen, & Cook, 2004; Niaura, 
Shadel, Goldstein, Hutchinson, & Abrams, 2001; Patterson  et al., 2003; Smith 
et al., 2003; Wetter et al., 1994). 
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2.2 Participants 
I used posted adverts (see Appendix A) and on-line adverts displayed in 
the Department of Psychology electronic experimental booking system to recruit 
participants from the University of Southampton campus for research into “the 
experience of reward in nicotine dependence”.  Participants included both 
students and staff members. Prior to Study 1, I asked participants to fill in the 
FTND (Heatherton et al., 1991) to screen them in terms of their level of 
dependency. I classified participants as high or low dependence according to a 
median split on their FTND score. If their FTND score was greater than the 
median (3 >), then I classified them as high dependence. If their FTND score 
was equal or smaller than the median (≤ 3), then I classified them as low 
dependence.  I used this classification in all subsequent studies in this research. 
Prior to each experimental session (studies 1, 2, 4, and 5), I randomly 
assigned participants to two conditions: withdrawal and satiation. In the 
withdrawal condition, I asked participants to abstain from smoking overnight or 
for at least 8 hours during the day before testing. In the satiation condition, I 
asked them to smoke as usual before coming to the laboratory. In addition, in 
the satiation condition I asked participants to smoke a cigarette immediately 
before coming to the laboratory in order to ensure that the difference between 
the withdrawal and satiation conditions was maximised.  
As mentioned at the end of chapter 1, in this research, I aimed to 
replicate and extend the finding of Powell et al. (2002) of reduced reward 
responsivity in withdrawal using a modified CARROT procedure. Therefore, I 
conducted power analysis to determine the number of participants needed to 
identify the large effect size reported by Powell et al. The effect size for the  
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completed the CARROT, I asked them to fill in the SHAPS (Snaith et al., 1995) 
and lastly, I asked them to fill in the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). 
The procedure lasted on average 30 minutes across studies. 
After collecting the data, I made available to each participant a 
debriefing statement (see Appendix F). I gave all participants the amount of 
money they gained in the CARROT, which was on average £5.00 per participant 
across studies. Furthermore, participants earned £3.50 for their participation. 
Psychology students earned credits (2 per 30 minutes) that counted towards their 
coursework grade. 
       2.4 Design 
I measured reward responsivity behaviourally using the CARROT task 
in Study 1, Study 2, Study 3, and Study 4. In Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3, I 
carried out the conditions of the reward responsivity test within-participants. In 
Study 4, I manipulated the conditions both within- and between-participants. In 
Study 5, I measured reward responsivity using a questionnaire measure of 
responsivity to environmental pleasure/reward (the SHAPS) under different 
between-participant conditions. 
In Study 1, Study 2, Study 4, and Study 5, I manipulated smoking status 
(withdrawal/satiation) between-participants, whereas in Study 3 smoking status 
was manipulated within-participants.  
The dependent variable in Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3 was sorting rate 
(i.e., number of cards sorted divided by the time it took to sort them) under 
reward and no reward. In Study 4, the dependent variable was reward 
responsivity (REWRESP) calculated as mean sorting rate under reward minus  
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withdrawal and 9 in satiation) and 13 participants in high dependence (5 in 
withdrawal and 8 in satiation). 
Initially, I also decided that participants would receive only the money 
they earned in the CARROT (estimated to be a maximum of £1.50 per 
participant) and no extra money for their participation. However, due to the very 
low rates of participation, I decided to pay participants £3.50 for their 
participation in addition to the money they earned in the CARROT. The first 10 
participants received only the money they earned in the CARROT, whereas the 
remaining 22 received an extra £3.50 for their participation. 
Furthermore, for 2 participants the assignment to the satiation and 
withdrawal conditions was not random. Although I asked those 2 participants to 
abstain from smoking before coming for testing, they failed to do so. They 
refused to try to abstain. As I did not want to miss their data, I tested those 
smokers under satiation. 
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3.3 Discussion 
In the present study, I adopted a counterbalanced CARROT design to 
investigate the hypothesis that abstinent smokers show decreased reward 
responsivity compared to satiated smokers (e.g., Al-Adawi & Powell, 1997; 
Powell et al., 2002).  I also investigated the differences in reward responsivity 
between high and low dependence participants. 
There was a significant main effect of reward, which confirmed the 
validity of the counterbalanced CARROT procedure. 
Moreover, there was a marginally significant Reward × Smoking Status 
interaction: Both high and low dependence participants significantly increased 
their mean CARROT sorting rates in the rewarded trial under satiation but not 
under withdrawal. The difference between the sorting rates of the rewarded and 
nonrewarded trials was significant under satiation; however, the effect did not 
approach significance under withdrawal. This is consistent with findings by Al-
Adawi and Powell (1997) and Powell et al. (2002) who found that abstinent 
smokers showed significantly less acceleration in response to financial incentive 
compared with satiated smokers and nonsmokers. Subsequent consumption of a 
cigarette was effective in elevating reward responsivity to the normal range. It is 
also consistent with findings by Epping-Jordan et al. (1998) who showed that 
spontaneous nicotine withdrawal in rats resulted in a significant decrease in 
brain reward function, as measured by elevations in brain reward thresholds, 
which persisted for days.  
Empirical evidence indicates that the mesocorticolimbic DA system 
mediates, at least in part, the reinforcing properties of psychoactive drugs,  
 
108 
 
including nicotine. Most psychoactive drugs increase dopaminergic transmission 
within this system, especially in the nucleus accumbens (Koob & LeMoal, 
1997). Thus, the findings suggest that abstaining smokers may have impaired 
dopaminergic function or, in other words, abstaining smokers show weakened 
incentive motivation that may reflect low levels of activity in mesocorticolimbic 
pathways. Therefore, smoking might be associated with alterations in motivation 
as indexed by reward responsivity. Support for this comes from findings that 
showed that brain reward pathways are less activated in nicotine addicts 
compared to healthy controls (e.g., Martin-Soelch et al., 2001). 
It was expected that, because highly dependent smokers experience more 
severe withdrawal compared to low dependence smokers, the difference in 
reward responsivity in satiation and withdrawal would be greater for highly 
dependent smokers. However, I found no evidence to support this view. The 
results indicated that the effects of withdrawal on reward responsivity were the 
same for the high and low dependence participants. This suggests that 
withdrawal effects are present even in low dependence smokers. Alternatively, 
the high dependence sample was not dependent enough. 
In sum, I used a counterbalanced CARROT procedure and found a 
Reward × Smoking Status interaction. Thus, participants increased their mean 
CARROT sorting rate when they were satiated but not when they were 
withdrawn. However, the effect was marginally significant. This result provides 
weak support to previous findings (Al-Adawi & Powell, 1997; Powell et al., 
2002). To overcome potential limitations of the present study, the aim of the 
next study was to use a bigger sample and a better, counterbalanced again, 
CARROT procedure. I needed 26 participants per group to achieve a power of  
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.80 at the .05 level of significance (Cohen, 1992).  Because I only had 32 
participants in total, I increased the number of participants to 80, 40 in each 
smoking status group. Moreover, I improved the CARROT procedure. Thus, 
instead of giving participants 20 cards to sort as practice, I increased the number 
of cards to 60. In addition, I added more rewarded and nonrewarded trials to the 
CARROT. I made these modifications to the procedure of the CARROT to 
reduce measurement error. 
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as quickly and as accurately as possible into three piles. The sorting was based 
on whether the numeral 1, 2, or 3 appeared on the card. It soon became evident 
that there was great variability in the way the cards were sorted. Some 
participants would throw the cards onto each pile, minimising the movement of 
their card-sorting hand; others would carefully place the cards on top of each 
pile, maximising precision at the expense of speed. This inter-participant 
variability was unsystematic and contributed to random error. In addition, 
although I asked participants to sort the cards as quickly and as accurately as 
possible, most of the participants compromised accuracy for speed. That is, they 
were more concerned with sorting the cards fast rather than sorting them 
accurately. This, in turn, might have produced ceiling effects in sorting rate that 
could have masked any effect of reward. 
Thus, the aim of the next two studies (Pilot 1 and Pilot 2) was to address 
these “key” problems in the look for an effect of reward. In the two pilot studies, 
I examined whether a number of changes to the procedure of the task would 
increase the task’s reliability. Thus, in Pilot 1, I reduced the variability in the 
way the cards were sorted by introducing cardboard boxes into which they had 
to be placed with reasonable accuracy. Moreover, I introduced a monetary 
penalty for mistakes in order to increase the time taken to sort the cards. These 
changes appeared to produce a slight improvement in the measure’s reliability. 
In Pilot 2, I made a further change to the procedure of the CARROT: I increased 
the time taken to complete each rewarded and nonrewarded trial in an attempt to 
increase the effort participants put in the rewarded trials. This produced the 
desired improvement in the measure’s reliability. The two pilot studies will be 
presented next.  
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procedure were successful at improving the measure’s reliability; therefore, 
ensuring that the CARROT could be used to detect any differences in the effect 
of withdrawal on reward responsivity between different levels of dependence.  
Thus, the aim of the next study was to use this new improved CARROT 
procedure to investigate the differences in reward responsivity between high and 
low dependence smokers in satiation and after overnight abstinence. 
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Figure 5.1. Mean CARROT sorting rate (+SE) in reward and no reward
for low dependence (W/S: n = 16) and high dependence (W/S: n = 16) 
participants.
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Figure 5.1 shows the mean CARROT sorting rate in each of the 
experimental conditions for low and high dependence participants. As Figure 
5.1 shows, both low and high dependence participants increased their sorting 
rate under reward in withdrawal and satiation.  Furthermore, for both low and 
high dependence participants, sorting rate in the nonrewarded and rewarded 
trials was higher in satiation compared to withdrawal (see Figure 5.1). 
Moreover, both low and high dependence participants increased their sorting 
rate from the nonrewarded to the rewarded trials more under withdrawal than 
under satiation. Therefore, there was no indication that the effect of reward was 
larger under satiation.  Finally, it looks like high dependence smokers had  
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Figure 5.2. Mean CARROT sorting rate (+SE) in reward and 
no reward in withdrawal (n = 32) and satiation (n = 32).
 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the mean CARROT sorting rate in each of the 
experimental conditions and illustrates the marginally significant Reward × 
Smoking Status interaction (Table 5.1). As Figure 5.2 shows, there was a main 
effect of reward: Mean CARROT sorting rate was higher in the rewarded trials 
in withdrawal and satiation compared with the mean CARROT sorting rate in 
the nonrewarded trials in withdrawal and satiation. Moreover, there was a main 
effect of smoking status (see Figure 5.2). Thus, satiated smokers had higher 
mean CARROT sorting rates in the rewarded and nonrewarded trials compared 
with withdrawn smokers. Figure 5.2 also shows that the effect of reward was 
more pronounced under withdrawal than under satiation. That is, participants 
increased their sorting rate in the rewarded trials when they were withdrawn  
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5.3 Discussion 
There was a strong main effect of reward: Sorting rates were 
significantly higher under reward than under no reward. Therefore, the 
modifications that were made to the procedure of the CARROT improved the 
measure’s reliability. However, there was no evidence to support the first 
hypothesis. Reward responsivity scores were not higher in satiation compared to 
withdrawal. Although this could be due to the fact that strong reward effects 
might be less vulnerable to the impact of withdrawal, a marginally significant 
Reward × Smoking Status interaction was found. However, it was opposite to 
the predicted direction: Reward responsivity scores were higher in withdrawal 
compared to satiation. This was in contrast to the findings of Study 1. There was 
no evidence to support the second hypothesis. The difference in reward 
responsivity between satiation and withdrawal was not greater with higher levels 
of dependence. This result did not replicate the findings of Study 2. However, 
there was a main effect of smoking status, with satiated smokers showing higher 
sorting rates compared to smokers in withdrawal.  
I did not replicate the Reward × Smoking Status interaction reported in 
the literature (e.g., Powell et al., 2002) and found in Study 1. It is unlikely that 
failure to replicate the interaction was due to limitations in the way I 
administered the behavioural measure for two reasons. First, the changes that 
were made to the procedure of the CARROT increased the measure’s reliability; 
thus, a strong main effect of reward was found in the present study. Second, the 
withdrawal manipulation was successful. In an attempt to find out why I failed 
to replicate the Reward × Smoking Status interaction reported in the literature, 
the methodology I used in the studies of the present thesis was examined and  
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compared to the methodology used in the studies where the interaction was 
reported (e.g., Powell et al., 2002). This will be discussed in the next section. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INTERIM DISCUSSION AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
In the studies of the present thesis, the presentation of the rewarded and 
nonrewarded trials was counterbalanced. REWRESP was calculated as mean 
sorting rate in R minus mean sorting rate in N, that is, REWRESP = R – N. I did 
not replicate the Reward × Smoking Status interaction reported in the literature 
(Powell et al., 2002). Powell et al. used a NRN design where REWRESP was 
calculated as R – (N + N) /2 and reported a Reward × Smoking Status 
interaction: The difference between nonreward and reward was pronounced 
under satiation but not under withdrawal. Powell et al. did not use a control 
condition in which no reward was used throughout. Therefore, their results 
might reflect the different global effects of satiation and withdrawal on 
performance over the three trials of the CARROT task (i.e., practice effects) 
rather than the different effects of satiation and withdrawal on CARROT reward 
responsivity (i.e., reward effects). Because withdrawal can produce attentional 
deficits, and nicotine can improve attentional performance (Koelega, 1992), 
performance might have improved more across the series of the three trials 
when participants were tested under satiation than when tested under 
withdrawal.  
Recall that Powell et al. calculated reward responsivity as a difference 
score in performance between the average of the first and third trial and the 
second (i.e., T2 – [T1 + T3] /2). This measure could confound the practice and 
reward effects of smoking status. For example, if practice in satiation led to a 
rapid asymptote in sorting performance, whereas practice in withdrawal led to 
only gradual improvement between trials, then the measure would show an  
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apparent reward responsivity effect even if none existed. However, practice 
effects can be controlled by counterbalancing such that rewarded and 
nonrewarded trials occur equally often in each position of a two- or four-trial 
series. Reward responsivity would then be calculated as the average 
performance in the rewarded trials minus the average performance in the 
nonrewarded trials. This revised design allowed a determination of whether 
impaired performance in the CARROT during nicotine withdrawal should be 
properly characterised as an effect of withdrawal on reward responsivity. 
I looked at practice effects in the data of Study 3 in order to examine 
whether improvement in performance over a series of trials (i.e., practice 
effects) was different under satiation and under withdrawal.  I carried out  
2 × 2 (Trial × Smoking Status) repeated measures Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) using CARROT sorting rate as the dependent variable. The within-
participants factors were smoking status (withdrawal/satiation) and trial (trials 1-
4). Table 6.1 shows the results of the two-way ANOVA. It can be seen that, with 
an alpha level of .05, there was a significant main effect of trial and a marginally 
significant main effect of smoking status. 
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under withdrawal and satiation in a NRN design, which is the one used by 
Powell et al. (2002). 
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Figure 6.2. Hypothetical graph of CARROT sorting rate in withdrawal
(W) and satiation (S) in T1 (Trial 1), T2 (Trial 2), and T3 (Trial 3). Points
represent the mean CARROT sorting rate in each of the three trials in
 W and S.
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Looking at Figure 6.2, it was hypothesised that if practice effects for 
satiated smokers are stronger compared to practice effects for withdrawn 
smokers, then satiated smokers would increase their sorting rate from Trial 1 to 
Trial 2 more than withdrawn smokers would. Satiated smokers would reach 
their maximum sorting rate in the rewarded Trial 2. After that, their sorting rate 
would either remain the same or decrease in Trial 3.  However, if practice 
effects were weaker under withdrawal compared to satiation, then withdrawn 
smokers would increase their sorting rate from Trial 1 to Trial 2 less than 
satiated smokers would. Withdrawn smokers would not reach their maximum  
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sorting rate in Trial 2. Their sorting rate would still increase from Trial 2 to Trial 
3; they would either reach their maximum sorting rate in Trial 3 or not. If 
practice effects asymptote later under withdrawal than under satiation, then this 
could produce an impression of a withdrawal effect on REWRESP under a T2 – 
(T1 + T3) /2 design (Figure 6.2).  
In order to investigate this hypothesis, I requested the data that were not 
available in the published article by Powell et al. (2002). The data were kindly 
provided for re-analysis. Powell et al. (2002) used a NRN design but no control 
group. They calculated REWRESP as T2 - (T1 + T3) /2. Under a T2 - (T1 + T3) 
/2 design, they found a significant Reward × Smoking Status interaction: 
Satiated smokers increased their sorting rate in the rewarded trial (T2) 
significantly more than withdrawn smokers did. Thus, satiated smokers were 
able to respond to reward, whereas withdrawn smokers were not. However, 
when I examined practice effects (i.e., improvement in performance) for satiated 
and withdrawn smokers across the three trials in Powell et al.’s data, I found that 
practice effects differed for satiated and withdrawn smokers. 
Table 6.3 shows the results of the 2 × 2 (Trial × Smoking Status) 
ANOVA. The within-participants factors were smoking status 
(withdrawal/satiation) and trial (trials 1-3). The dependent variable was 
CARROT sorting rate. It can be seen (Table 6.3) that, with an alpha level of .05, 
there was a significant main effect of trial and a significant Smoking Status × 
Trial interaction. 
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Thus, the withdrawal effect on REWRESP under a T2 – (T1 + T3) /2 
design appears to be, at least in part, due to the fact that practice effects 
asymptote later under withdrawal than under satiation. That is, sated smokers 
improve their performance in the CARROT task and reach their asymptotic 
level (i.e., maximum sorting rate) faster than withdrawn smokers do. However, 
it is also possible that the increase in sorting rate in the rewarded trial (Trial 2) 
reflects a combination of reward-induced plus practice-based speeding.  
This was investigated in the next study. I used group NRN (where the 
second of the three trials was rewarded) and looked at the effect of reward under 
a T2 – (T1 + T3) /2 within-participants design to facilitate comparisons with 
Powell et al. (2002). The dependent variable was calculated as T2 – (T1 + T3) /2 
for group NRN. In order to examine whether withdrawal might interact with 
practice effects, I used group NNN (where all three trials were nonrewarded) as 
control. The dependent variable was calculated as T2 – (T1 + T3) /2 for groups 
NRN and NNN. Finally, I examined the effect of reward in a between-
participants design (groups NNN and RRR) to avoid practice artefacts. Reward 
respoonsivity was calculated as the average of the three rewarded trials (group 
RRR) minus the average of the three nonrewarded trials (group NNN). 
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(c) A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 (Trial × Group × Smoking Status × Dependence) 
mixed factorial design. The within-participants factor was trial (trials 1 – 3). The 
between-participants factors were smoking status (withdrawal/satiation), 
dependence (low/high), and group (group NNN = all three trials 
nonrewarded/group RRR = all trials rewarded). The dependent variable was 
calculated as the average of the three rewarded trials (group RRR) minus the 
average of the three nonrewarded trials (group NNN). 
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Figure 7.2.  T2 - (T1 + T3) /2 mean CARROT sorting rate (+SE) in 
groups NNN (n = 22) and NRN (n = 22).
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Figure 7.3. T2 - (T1 + T3) /2 mean CARROT sorting rate (+SE) in 
withdrawal (n = 22) and satiation (n = 22) in groups NNN and NRN
combined. 
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  Figure 7.2 illustrates the main effect of group (Table 7.2): Reward 
responsivity was higher in NRN compared to NNN. Figure 7.3 illustrates the 
main effect of smoking status (Table 7.2): Reward responsivity was higher in 
satiation compared to withdrawal. These results indicate that reward did indeed 
have an effect, resulting in bigger T2 – (T1 + T3) /2 value in group NRN, and 
that the T2 – (T1 + T3) / 2 measure was lower in withdrawal. However, these 
two effects were independent, that is, there was no Group × Smoking Status 
interaction. 
In order to determine whether the smoking status effect could be 
interpreted as an effect of practice, I used polynomial contrasts to examine the 
trends in sorting rate across the three trials.  
I carried out 2 × 2 × 2 (Trial × Group × Smoking Status) repeated 
measures ANOVA. The within-participants factor was trial (trials 1-3). The 
between- participants factors were group (NNN/NRN) and smoking status 
(withdrawal/satiation). The tests for the trends of interest are given in Table 7.4. 
As can be seen (Table 7.3), there was a significant quadratic contrast for the 
Trial × Smoking Status interaction and a significant quadratic contrast for the 
Trial × Group interaction. 
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Figure 7.4. CARROT sorting rate across the three trials in withdrawal 
(W) and satiation (S) in groups NNN and NRN combined. Points 
represent mean CARROT sorting rate in each of the three trials in W 
and S; vertical lines represent standard errors of the means.
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Figure 7.4 shows the mean CARROT sorting rate in withdrawal and 
satiation and illustrates the significant quadratic contrast (Table 7.3), that is, the 
levelling-off of performance across trials. As can be seen (Figure 7.4), further 
increase in sorting rate after T2 was less marked in satiation compared to 
withdrawal. This suggests that satiation pushed sorting rates to a faster 
adaptation compared to withdrawal and produced a bigger difference between 
T2 (reward) and (T1+ T3) /2 (no reward) compared to withdrawal. However, 
this effect was identical for groups NNN and NRN. 
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Figure 7.5. CARROT sorting rate across the three trials in groups 
NNN and NRN. Points represent mean CARROT sorting rate in 
each of the three trials in groups NNN and NRN; vertical lines 
represent standard errors of the means.
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Figure 7.5 shows the mean CARROT sorting rate across the three trials 
for groups NNN and NRN and illustrates the marginally significant linear 
contrast (i.e., the upward trend in performance across trials) and the significant 
quadratic contrast (Table 7.3). As can be seen, sorting rate increased across the 
three trials for both groups; however, the increase in sorting rate after T2 was 
less pronounced for group NRN.  Thus, the effect of reward in T2 in NRN 
produced a bigger increase in sorting rate from T1 to T2 for NRN compared to 
NNN. However, removal of the reward in T3 prevented a significant increase in 
sorting rate from the rewarded T2 to the nonrewarded T3. The difference 
between T2 and T3 was significant for NNN where reward was constantly 
absent. Therefore, the presence of reward in T2 in NRN pushed sorting rates to a 
faster adaptation (i.e., to the asymptotic or maximum sorting rate) and produced  
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a bigger difference between T2 (reward) and (T1+ T3) /2 (no reward) for group 
NRN compared to NNN. This effect was independent of smoking status.  
Looking at the patterns in Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5, it can be seen that 
sorting rate across the three trials under satiation was similar to sorting rate 
across the three trials under reward (i.e., group NRN). Similarly, sorting rate 
under withdrawal was similar to sorting rate under no reward (i.e., group NNN). 
The presence of reward in Trial 2 pushed sorting rates to a faster adaptation 
irrespective of smoking status. Similarly, satiation pushed sorting rates to a 
faster adaptation irrespective of the presence of reward. On the other hand, a fast 
adaptation was prevented by withdrawal irrespective of the presence of reward 
In addition, a fast adaptation was prevented when no reward was introduced 
irrespective of smoking status. Thus, satiation and reward produced a similar 
pattern of sorting rate across the three trials. That is, participants reached their 
asymptote faster when they were satiated or when a reward was introduced in 
Trial 2. Withdrawal and the absence of reward also produced a similar pattern of 
sorting rate across the three trials: Participants did not reach their asymptote as 
fast when they were withdrawn or when there was no reward introduced in Trial 
2.  
In other words, practice effects were stronger in satiation compared to 
withdrawal and stronger under reward compared to no reward. Thus, the T2 – 
(T1 + T3) /2 value was increased in satiation; however, that increase was 
independent of group.  The T2 – (T1 + T3) /2 value was also increased by 
reward; however, that increase was independent of smoking status. 
For both groups (NNN and NRN), adaptation was faster under satiation 
than under withdrawal. When group NRN only was examined under a T2 –  
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Figure 7.6. CARROT sorting rate across the three trials for groups
NNN and RRR combined. Points represent mean CARROT sorting 
rate in each of the three trials; vertical lines represent standard errors
of the means.
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7.3  Discussion 
There was an effect of withdrawal on reward responsivity in the within-
participants NRN design where reward responsivity was calculated as T2 – (T1 
+ T3) /2. Thus, the difference between reward and no reward was smaller under 
withdrawal than under satiation. However, when the effect of withdrawal on 
reward responsivity―calculated as T2 – (T1 + T3) /2―was assessed using 
group NNN as control, the main effect of withdrawal on reward responsivity 
disappeared. There was a main effect of smoking status and a main effect of 
group. Therefore, satiated smokers had higher reward responsivity scores 
compared to withdrawn smokers. Moreover, reward responsivity scores were 
higher in group NRN compared to group NNN. However, these two effects were 
independent of one another. In other words, the effect of smoking status was 
similar either reward was present (i.e., group NRN) or absent (i.e., group NNN); 
the effect of group (or reward) was the same either participants were sated or 
withdrawn. Thus, practice effects were stronger in satiation compared to 
withdrawal and stronger under reward compared to no reward. However, the 
effects of practice and reward did not interact. That is, the T2 – (T1 + T3) /2 
value was greater in satiation compared to withdrawal; however, this effect was 
independent of the presence of reward in Trial 2. In addition, the T2 – (T1 + T3) 
/2 value was greater in group NRN compared to group NNN; however, this 
effect was independent of smoking status. Therefore, in the case of the smoking 
status effect, this was due to participants reaching their maximum sorting rate 
faster when they were satiated compared to when they were withdrawn; 
however, this effect was independent of that produced when reward was 
introduced in Trial 2. The fact that the effect of withdrawal on reward  
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responsivity was found only when group NRN was examined under a T2 – (T1 
+ T3) /2 design, but this effect was similar either reward was present or absent 
when group NNN was included as  control, suggests that withdrawal does not 
impact reward responsivity. Withdrawal interacts with practice effects to 
produce an impression of a withdrawal effect on reward responsivity under a 
NRN design.   
When the effect of reward was examined in a between-participants 
design (i.e., groups NNN and RRR) to avoid practice artefacts, reward 
responsivity was calculated as the average of the three rewarded trials (group 
RRR) minus the average of the three nonrewarded trials (group NNN). There 
was a main effect of trial: Mean CARROT sorting rate increased with 
successive trials. Furthermore, there was a main effect of smoking status: 
Satiated smokers had higher mean sorting rate compared to withdrawn smokers. 
However, the effect of group (i.e., reward) was not significant. That is, 
participants who completed rewarded trials did not have significantly higher 
sorting rates compared with participants who completed nonrewarded trials. 
This stands in contrast to earlier results (Study 1, Pilot 2, and Study 3) where a 
reliable effect of reward was found. It seems likely that this discrepancy is due 
to the different sensitivities of the within- and between-participants designs. The 
main effect of reward was significant only when nonreward and reward were 
manipulated within-participants. Perhaps it was the contrast between nonreward 
and reward that produced the reward effect in the within-participants design. 
When that contrast was removed in the between-participants design (NNN – 
RRR), the effect of reward did not approach statistical significance.   
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In sum, the results of the present study did not confirm the hypothesis 
that reward responsivity is reduced in withdrawal. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence that the difference in reward responsivity scores between satiation and 
withdrawal was bigger with higher levels of dependency. Thus, there was no 
evidence in support of the indirect reinforcing properties of nicotine in humans. 
However, it may be that these effects do exist but are hard to measure with the 
procedures available due to nicotine’s effects on psychomotor performance and 
attention. 
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Figure 8.1. Mean positive affect score (+SE) in withdrawal (n = 103) 
and satiation (n = 106).  
 
Figure 8.1 shows the mean PANAS-Positive Affect score in withdrawal 
and satiation and illustrates the significant main effect of smoking status (see 
Table 8.1). As can be seen (Figure 8.1), participants reported significantly 
higher levels of positive affect when they were under satiation compared to 
when they were under withdrawal. 
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Figure 8.2. Mean SHAPS-Social Interaction subscale score (+SE)
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  Figure 8.2 shows the mean SHAPS-Social Interaction subscale score in 
low and high dependence and illustrates the significant main effect of 
dependence (see Table 8.1). As can be seen (Figure 8.2), high dependence 
participants had significantly higher SHAPS-Social Interaction subscale score 
compared with low dependence participants. That is, high dependence 
participants reported significantly higher anhedonia or lower ability to 
experience pleasure/reward associated with their social interactions compared to 
low dependence participants. 
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Figure 8.3 shows the mean SHAPS-Interests/Pastimes subscale score in 
low and high dependence and illustrates the significant main effect of 
dependence (see Table 8.1). As can be seen (Figure 8.3), high dependence 
participants had significantly higher SHAPS-Interests/Pastimes subscale score 
compared with low dependence participants. That is, high dependence 
participants reported significantly higher anhedonia or lower ability to 
experience pleasure/reward associated with their interests and pastimes 
compared to low dependence participants. 
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Figure 8.4. Mean negative affect score (+SE)  in low dependence
(n = 111) and high dependence (n = 98).  
 
 
Figure 8.4 shows the mean PANAS-Negative Affect score in low and 
high dependence and illustrates the main effect of dependence, which, although 
significant at the .05 level (see Table 8.1), did not reach significance using 
Bonferroni corrected alpha. As can be seen (Figure 8.4), high dependence 
participants reported higher levels of negative affect compared to low 
dependence participants.  
In sum, satiated smokers reported higher levels of positive affect 
compared to withdrawn smokers. Moreover, high dependence smokers reported 
higher levels of negative affect compared to low dependence smokers. In 
addition, high dependence smokers were less able to respond to pleasure/reward 
associated with their interests/pastimes and social interactions compared to low 
dependence smokers. 
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8.3 Discussion 
There was a significant main effect of smoking status on the positive 
affect measure: Satiated smokers reported significantly higher levels of positive 
affect compared to withdrawn smokers. This means that one of the reasons 
smokers self-administer nicotine is to obtain an increase in positive affect; 
however, this effect did not vary with level of dependency. That is, there was no 
Smoking Status × Dependence interaction. Both low and high dependence 
participants reported experiencing similar levels of positive affect in withdrawal. 
This might be because withdrawal disturbs affect similarly in low and high 
dependence smokers. Alternatively, the low and high dependence samples of the 
present study were not different enough to detect a greater effect of withdrawal 
on positive affect in high dependence participants. 
Moreover, there was a main effect of dependence on the negative affect 
measure: High dependence smokers reported higher levels of negative affect 
compared to low dependence smokers. Although the effect of dependence was 
significant at the .05 level, it did not reach statistical significance using 
Bonferroni corrected alpha. Furthermore, the main effect of dependence on the 
negative affect measure was not moderated by smoking status. This might be 
because the negative affect measure (i.e., PANAS-NA subscale) was not 
sensitive to smoking status. Alternatively, it might be that the affective distress 
that smokers experience during abstinence is due to decreases in positive affect 
rather than to increases in negative affect.  
The overall SHAPS measure of reward sensitivity was not sensitive to 
smoking status. That is, there was no indication that withdrawn smokers show 
reduced ability to experience environmental pleasure/reward compared to  
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satiated smokers. Furthermore, the effect of smoking status was the same for 
low and high dependence participants. Powell et al. (2002, 2004) reported 
reduced ability to experience environmental pleasure/reward in withdrawal in 
their sample of smokers. This is not consistent with the results of this research 
(potential reasons for this discrepancy are discussed in Section 9.1.1.2).  
There was a significant main effect of dependence on two out of the four 
SHAPS subscales: the Interests/Pastimes subscale and the Social Interaction 
subscale. Thus, highly dependent participants reported significantly less ability 
to experience pleasure/reward associated with their interests/pastimes and social 
interactions compared to low dependence participants. This may suggest that 
impairments in responsivity to environmental pleasure/reward develop with 
chronic nicotine administration. Deficits in environmental pleasure/reward were 
not observed among the low dependence participants. This could be because 
deficits in sensitivity to environmental pleasure/reward are too small to observe 
among the low dependence smokers. Alternatively, such deficits have not 
started developing yet. 
Although it was expected that the difference in ability to experience 
environmental pleasure/reward between withdrawal and satiation would be 
bigger in highly dependent smokers, this was not the case. This might be 
because the present dependence sample had medium to low levels of 
dependency. If disturbances in reward sensitivity develop with chronic nicotine 
administration, then a more dependent sample than the one of the present 
research would be more appropriate. 
In sum, although smokers self-administered nicotine in order to increase 
their levels of positive affect, with the development of dependence higher levels  
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humans, nicotine administration increases sensitivity to reward, whereas 
nicotine withdrawal decreases sensitivity to reward. However, the results of the 
present research suggest that human studies on the effects of nicotine on reward 
responsivity, measured behaviourally using the CARROT task (e.g., Al-Adawi 
and Powell, 1997; Powell et al., 2002, 2004; Smolka et al., 2004), are limited 
due to the methodology they employed. Thus, what has been reported as an 
effect of withdrawal on reward responsivity is actually an impression of a 
withdrawal effect. It is produced because practice effects (i.e., improvements in 
performance over time or over successive CARROT trials) are stronger in 
satiation compared to withdrawal. That is, card-sorting performance across a 
series of three CARROT trials improves faster under satiation compared to 
under withdrawal. This was not evident in the published studies (e.g., Al-Adawi 
& Powell, 1997; Powell et al., 2002, 2004; Smolka et al., 2004) because a 
control condition was not employed. In this research, when I used a control 
group (i.e., all trials non-rewarded) to examine whether practice effects might 
interact with reward effects, I found that the effects of reward and practice (i.e., 
smoking status) were independent of one another. Furthermore, when I 
examined reward responsivity between-participants to avoid practice artefacts, 
the effect of reward did not approach statistical significance.  
In addition, although highly dependent smokers should experience more 
severe withdrawal compared to low dependence smokers, withdrawal effects on 
reward responsivity were the same for low and high dependence participants. 
This suggests that withdrawal effects are present even in low dependence 
smokers. Alternatively, the high dependence sample was not dependent enough; 
most FTND scores were at the low (1-3) and middle range (3-6).  
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the sample that were not accounted for. For example, pre-existing depressive 
symptoms in the sample of Powell et al. might have been exacerbated during 
nicotine withdrawal; thus, they contributed to reduced responsivity to 
environmental pleasure/reward. There is no information regarding the FTND 
score of participants in the study by Powell et al. (2004). Therefore, 
comparisons cannot be made. Clearly, the effect of smoking status on SHAPS 
reward sensitivity reported by Powell et al. (2002, 2004) requires replication. 
There was a significant main effect of dependence on two out of the four 
SHAPS subscales: the Interests/Pastimes subscale and the Social Interaction 
subscale. Thus, highly dependent participants reported significantly less ability 
to experience pleasure/reward associated with their interests/pastimes and social 
interactions compared to low dependence participants. It might be that deficits 
in sensitivity to environmental pleasure/reward are too small to observe among 
the low dependence smokers. Alternatively, such deficits have not started 
developing yet. The fact that, unlike low dependence smokers, highly dependent 
smokers were not able to respond to pleasure/reward (associated with their 
interests/pastimes and social interactions) provides support to the argument that 
impairments in responsivity to environmental pleasure/reward develop with 
chronic nicotine administration. An interesting finding is that dependence had an 
effect only on the two SHAPS subscales that tap on the construct of motivation 
(i.e., the Interests/Pastimes and Social Interaction subscales). Dependence had 
no effect on the other two SHAPS subscales that measure sensory gratification 
(i.e., the Food/Drink and Sensory Experience subscales). Again, this provides 
support to the argument that normal motivational processes are compromised in 
nicotine addiction.   
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However, nonsmokers took significantly less time than smokers did to carry a 
standpipe hose load up four flights of stairs.  Moreover, nonsmokers required 
less time than smokers did to complete the simulated rescue of a dummy from 
the fifth floor of a building. Participants did these tasks sequentially. The 
smokers took about 27% longer than did the nonsmokers to perform all tasks. 
Because smokers were not allowed to smoke during the tasks, it is possible that 
they were in some form of withdrawal that slowed their performance (Fowler, 
1989). These results illustrate the stimulant actions of nicotine on psychomotor 
performance. Because the CARROT requires speed in card sorting, nicotine-
induced increases in psychomotor activation could be interpreted as enhanced 
performance in the CARROT.  
  CARROT performance also requires sustained attention (vigilance) to 
detect and respond to changes in the numbers that appear on the cards and 
selective attention in order to attend to the target number on the card while 
simultaneously ignoring the irrelevant or distracting numbers. Accurate card 
sorting meant quick card sorting. Participants were required to correct mistakes 
in card sorting (when they realised they made them) by placing the cards in the 
correct boxes. Thus, insufficient attention to the numbers on the cards during 
card sorting and subsequent inaccuracy decreased card-sorting speed.  
  Nicotine has been shown to reliably reverse attentional deficits 
associated with withdrawal (e.g., Mancuso et al., 1999; Sherwood et al., 1992).   
For example, nicotine administration reversed deprivation-induced deficits in 
vigilance, and subsequent doses maintained normal functioning (Hasenfratz & 
Bättig, 1993; Foulds et al., 1996; Mancuso et al., 1999; Sherwood et al., 1992; 
Waller & Levander, 1980; Warburton & Mancuso, 1998). A study examining  
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the effects of nicotine on overnight performance showed that nicotine prevented 
the natural fatigue-related decreases in vigilance and thus in attentional 
performance (Parkin, Fairweather, Shamsi, Stanley, & Hindmarch, 1998). 
Similarly, nicotine administration to deprived smokers reversed withdrawal-
induced deficits in performance in measures of selective attention, such as the 
Stroop task (e.g., Hasenfratz & Bättig, 1993; Landers et al., 1992) and letter 
search tasks (e.g., Parrot & Roberts, 1991; Snyder & Henningfield, 1989). 
Finally, in smokers who were abstinent for 1 hour, smoking increased the 
suppression of distracting information, thus enhanced attentional performance, 
compared to sham smoking (Rodway et al., 2000).  
Overall, the evidence suggests that nicotine can increase arousal and 
reverse psychomotor and attentional deficits associated with withdrawal. In 
addition, nicotine can prevent fatigue-related decreases in psychomotor and 
attentional performance. Consistent with this, satiated smokers had significantly 
higher overall CARROT sorting rates compared to withdrawn smokers and 
increased their sorting rate speed from trial to trial more than withdrawn 
smokers did.  
These findings might be due to three reasons or combinations of those. 
First, this result might be consistent with negative reinforcement theories 
of addiction (e.g., Siegel, 1983; Wikler, 1948). According to these theories, 
drugs are self-administered because of the state they alleviate, in this case 
psychomotor and attentional deficits associated with withdrawal.  Nicotine may 
be initially self-administered for its positively reinforcing properties, that is, for 
an absolute enhancement in psychomotor performance (e.g., Tucha & Lange, 
2004; West & Jarvis, 1986). However, the fact that withdrawn smokers had  
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significantly lower sorting rates compared to satiated smokers may suggest that 
psychomotor and attentional performance were compromised during 
withdrawal.  Thus, it may be that, with the development of dependence, smokers 
self-administer nicotine primarily in order to reverse deficits in performance 
associated with nicotine withdrawal.   
Second, it may be that the present sample of smokers had inherent 
deficits in psychomotor and attentional performance, which increased the risk of 
taking up smoking in the first place. In this case, self-administration of nicotine 
would also be negatively reinforcing because it would serve to reverse inherent 
deficits. Because there is no information regarding participants’ psychomotor 
and attentional performance before they initiated smoking, it is difficult to 
determine whether nicotine was self-administered in order to reverse inherent 
deficits or withdrawal-induced deficits in performance.   
Finally, it may be that increases in performance observed among satiated 
smokers were absolute; that is, smokers’ psychomotor performance increased 
with every cigarette smoked. In that case, nicotine self-administration would be 
positively reinforcing. However, unless researchers tested satiated smokers’ 
psychomotor performance every time smokers had an additional cigarette and 
found that psychomotor performance increased, it is hard to draw conclusions 
about whether nicotine administration is positively reinforcing.  
In sum, the fact that satiated smokers had higher CARROT sorting rates 
compared to withdrawn smokers may be either due to nicotine’s positive or 
negative reinforcing properties, or both. 
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The finding that smokers self-administer nicotine to increase feelings of 
pleasure might be consistent with the positive reinforcement theory of addiction 
(e.g., Stewart et al., 1984, Wise & Bozarth, 1987). According to this theory, 
drugs are self-administered because of the state they induce, that is, pleasure or 
positive affect. Nicotine, like other psychostimulant drugs, increases DA release 
in the nucleus accumbens. This mediates the rewarding properties of the drug, 
which reinforce its self-administration (Wise & Bozarth, 1987). Furthermore, 
increased stimulation of DA receptors is associated with increased incentive 
learning or the attribution of increased incentive salience to the cues associated 
with acquisition and delivery of the drug (e.g., Balfour, Wright, Benwell, & 
Birrell, 2000). In addition, the mood-elevating effects of drugs are due to their 
reward-enhancing effects (Ahmed & Koob, 2005). Thus, according to positive 
reinforcement theories of addiction, drugs are self-administered for their 
primary reinforcing effects (i.e., increases in pleasure or positive affect).  
The finding that satiated smokers reported significantly higher positive 
affect compared to withdrawn smokers does not provide support to the notion of 
addiction as proposed by Robinson and Berridge (1993). They argue against a 
pleasure-seeking interpretation of drug self-administration. They believe that it 
is not the pleasure or liking associated with drug taking that motivates continued 
drug use but sensitisation-induced excessive wanting that is independent of 
liking. Although this distinction was not tested in this thesis, the finding of 
higher positive affect among satiated smokers suggests that nicotine self-
administration occurs, at least in part, because nicotine is liked, that is, it 
produces pleasure or positive affect.  
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Because administration of nicotine relieves symptoms of withdrawal 
(e.g., dysphoria and depressed mood), it is possible that smokers self-administer 
nicotine to increase feelings of pleasure (i.e., positive affect) that are 
compromised during drug withdrawal. This would be consistent with negative 
reinforcement theories of addiction (e.g., Siegel, 1983; Wikler, 1948). 
According to these theories, drugs are self-administered not because of the state 
they induce (i.e., pleasure/positive affect) but because of the state they alleviate, 
that is, depressed mood associated with withdrawal and/or other non-drug 
aversive states (e.g., pre-existing depression). 
Other theories have explained drug administration as an interplay 
between both positive and negative reinforcement. For example, Solomon and 
Corbit (1974, 1977), in their opponent process theory, claimed that drugs initiate 
an a-process that is experienced as drug pleasure. Activation of the a-process 
results in initiation of a b-process that opposes the a-process. This serves to 
counteract the effect of the drug and return the body to homeostasis. The sum 
result of those two opposing processes is the subjective hedonic state 
experienced by the individual. These hedonic states are either positively 
reinforcing A-states (pleasurable) or negatively reinforcing B-states (aversive), 
according to the strength of the a- and b- processes. Solomon and Corbit also 
posited that repeated drug use strengthens the b-process and, as a result, 
tolerance to the pleasurable effects of the drug develops. Thus, with repeated 
drug use, higher drug doses are required to gain the same pleasurable drug 
experience as was initially experienced. With repeated drug use, the b-process 
becomes so strong that it results in withdrawal symptoms when the drug is  
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argument that normal motivational processes are compromised with increasing 
levels of dependency. 
In addition, high dependence participants reported higher levels of 
negative affect. This result is consistent with findings from previous research 
(e.g., Becona et al., 1999; Breslau et al., 1994). In the study by Becona et al., 
dependence was measured by daily cigarette consumption. Affect was measured 
using the PANAS. The sample of smokers in Becona et al.’s study was divided 
into four groups according to their daily cigarette consumption: 0 (nonsmoking), 
1 to 15, 16 to 30, and 31 or more cigarettes/day. There were significant 
differences in negative affect between groups 1 to 15 versus 31 or more 
cigarettes/day. The group smoking 31 or more cigarettes/day reported 
significantly higher levels of negative affect compared to the group that smoked 
1 to 15 cigarettes/day.  Although in the present study a different dependence 
measure was used (i.e., FTND score), the results of the present study are similar 
to those by Becona et al. These findings provide support to the argument that 
higher levels of dependency are associated with higher levels of negative affect. 
Furthermore, the main effect of dependence on negative affect is consistent with 
the results of a study by Breslau et al. (1994). They found that affective distress 
was associated more with heavy smoking and nicotine dependence and less so 
with intermittent or nondependent smoking. The main effect of dependence on 
negative affect was not moderated by smoking status. This might suggest that 
the negative affect measure (i.e., PANAS-NA subscale) was not sensitive to 
smoking status. It might be that the affective distress that smokers experience 
during abstinence is due to decreases in positive affect rather than to increases in 
negative affect.   
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The main effects of dependence on the SHAPS subscales and on the 
negative affect measure fit in well with Koob and Le Moal’s (1997, 2001, 2005) 
model of addiction. According to this model, negative reinforcement 
mechanisms operate in the maintenance of nicotine addiction. Koob and Le 
Moal (2005), in a modification on Solomon and Corbit’s (1974, 1977) 
opponent-process theory, suggested that dependence might involve a change in 
hedonic set point that includes decreased reward sensitivity and increased 
aversive emotional states. The acute reward-enhancing and mood-elevating 
effects of nicotine would be followed by opposing reactions that would tend to 
return the system to its initial level of hedonic capacity (i.e., homeostasis). 
However, with continued increased drug self-administration the opponent 
process would fail to return the system to homeostasis before drug taking began 
again. This chronic deviation of the reward system from its homeostatic level 
would manifest as decreased reward sensitivity and increased negative affect; 
that is, an allostatic state. Because the allostatic state described by Koob and Le 
Moal would be a result of chronic increased drug self-administration, the 
disturbances in reward sensitivity and mood would become larger with 
increasing levels of nicotine dependency. Consistent with this, highly dependent 
smokers reported significantly higher levels of negative affect and reduced 
ability to experience environmental pleasure/reward compared to low 
dependence smokers. 
In sum, the main effect of dependence on responsivity to some aspects of 
environmental pleasure/reward provides only weak support for the indirect 
reinforcing properties of nicotine. The main effect of dependence on negative  
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In recent years, the view that learning can take two fundamentally 
different forms has become increasingly popular (Yin & Knowlton, 2006). The 
S-R habit learning (Hull, 1943) is one in which the occurrence of a stimulus 
automatically elicits a response without any anticipation of the consequences. 
That is, behaviour is not guided by outcome expectancy; it is controlled by 
antecedent stimuli (Everitt & Robbins, 2005). According to the S-R theory of 
learning, the occurrence of the stimulus will activate a response in an automatic 
way, that is, without requiring attention. Furthermore, the outcome is not part of 
the S-R association but merely strengthens or weakens it (Robbins & Everitt, 
1999; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). The other form of learning is the A-O one 
whereby knowledge is stored in the form of an expectation that can be recalled 
as needed to plan behaviour. For example, both animals and humans can encode 
the casual relationships between their actions and the outcome. Moreover, both 
animals and humans can control their actions according to their anticipation of, 
and desire for, the outcome.  Thus, A-O learning is controlled by the 
consequences or outcomes of actions (Dickinson, 1985; Yin & Knowlton, 
2006). 
Extensive research showed that the amount of training or practice (in 
particular the number of rewarded responses) is a crucial factor in determining 
the shift from A-O to S-R control over behaviour; that is, habit formation (Yin 
& Knowlton, 2006). Therefore, overtraining or extended practice tends to 
promote habit formation (Adams, 1982; Colwill & Rescorla, 1988; Dickinson, 
Balleine, Watt, Gonzalez, & Boakes, 1995). In other words, extended practice 
can transform an action into a simple habit that is relatively autonomous of the 
value of its original goal (Dickinson, 1985; Everitt & Robbins, 2005). As  
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Dickinson observed, during extended practice, the animal no longer experiences 
a correlation between variations in performance and variations in the associated 
consequences. This is because, with extended practice, the animal tends to 
respond in a consistently high rate; thus, experiences little change in the rate of 
reward. As a result, responding becomes habitual. Similarly, and for example, 
interval schedules (where a response is rewarded after a certain time interval has 
elapsed) tend to promote habit formation because the correlation between 
response rates and reward rates is low (Dickinson, 1985; Yin & Knowlton, 
2006). On the other hand, ratio schedules (where a response results in a certain 
probability of reward with more responses yielding more rewards) produce goal-
directed actions controlled by the A-O contingency. This is because ratio 
schedules set up a strong correlation between response rates and reward rates 
(Dickinson, 1985; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). In sum, as Dickinson argued, a well-
documented account of habit formation is that: 
     Instrumental behaviour, which starts out as an action controlled by  
     knowledge about its relation to the goal, with repeated practice becomes a  
     response, autonomous of the current value of the goal and simply triggered  
     by the stimuli in whose presence it has been repeatedly performed. (p. 72) 
One simple example of the above in human behaviour is the learning of 
motor skills, such as driving. At first, learners have to pay close attention to 
what they are doing. However, with practice, the movements become automatic 
or habitual. That is, the learner can drive without thinking about it and can even 
carry on a conversation at the same time. Similar automation or habit formation 
occurs in perceptual learning. For example, initially in letter-identification tasks, 
participants responded slowly and found it difficult to concentrate on more than  
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one targets presented simultaneously. With practice, however, participants’ 
performance improved substantially. Eventually, they could carry out the task 
automatically or habitually without any decrements in their performance when 
multiple targets were presented (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). The authors 
concluded that with extended practice strong associations are formed between 
the perception of a letter and the response to it. When these associations become 
sufficiently strong, the process occurs automatically or habitually at great speed 
and without conscious attention. 
The above observations suggest that giving participants extended 
practice trials on the CARROT task might make their card-sorting behaviour 
habitual. That is, with extended practice trials participants might reach a point 
where they sort the cards to their corresponding piles automatically or 
habitually. The aim would be to give enough practice trials so that both satiated 
and withdrawn participants reach their asymptotic sorting rate. If card sorting 
became habitual and attentional processing was no longer required to sort the 
cards, then it might be possible to examine whether the introduction of reward 
during the CARROT task would increase participants’ sorting rates from 
asymptote. If introduction of the reward increased sorting rates above the 
asymptote, then it might be argued that there was an effect of reward that was 
not confounded by practice effects. It would be expected that sorting rate under 
reward would increase more for satiated smokers than it would for withdrawn 
smokers. However, researchers still have to examine this. 
Another possible way to bring out the effects of nicotine on reward 
responsivity might be to increase the reward, that is, the amount of money given 
to participants. The CARROT measures reward responsivity by measuring  
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responsiveness to financial incentive. Because money is a conditioned 
reinforcer, according to results from animal studies, nicotine (as opposed to 
abstinence) should enhance responding for that conditioned reinforcer. 
Furthermore, the impact of the reinforcement-enhancing effects of nicotine 
should lessen with stimuli of decreasing reinforcing strengths (e.g., Chaudhri, 
2005). In other words, operant responding should decrease as the reinforcing 
value of the operant that supports responding decreases. As Herrnstein (1970) 
put it in his theory of response strength, which became known as the matching 
law, the absolute rate of any response is proportional to its associated 
reinforcement. Thus, if participants received a larger amount of money, then 
they would increase their card-sorting rate more. In the present research, 
participants received 10 pence for every five cards sorted accurately. Failure to 
find an effect of reward in the between-participants design and failure to 
reproduce the Reward x Smoking Status interaction reported in the literature 
might be because the amount of money participants received in the rewarded 
trials was not large enough. As such, it did not produce significant increases in 
sorting rate under reward or a significant difference in reward responsivity 
between satiated and withdrawn smokers. Thus, in future research using the 
CARROT, the value of the monetary reward could be increased. This monetary 
increase might make the effect of reward apparent. Furthermore, it might make 
the measure more sensitive to the impact of withdrawal on reward sensitivity.  
Moreover, alternative measures of motivation, such as the progressive 
ratio (PR) procedure, might be used.  The PR procedure involves responding on 
a button in order to obtain a reinforcer (e.g., cigarettes or money) under a 
progressively increasing work requirement (i.e., if five responses are required  
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for the first reinforcer, then the response requirement doubles for every 
subsequent reinforcer). The point at which the participant stops working to 
obtain an increasingly infrequent reinforcer is termed “the breaking point” 
(Hodos, 1961) and provides a measure of motivational strength. Hodos argued 
that this procedure could measure reward strength guessing that better rewards 
would lead to higher breaking points. It was also argued that the PR procedure is 
sensitive to changes in dopaminergic tone (Carr, Vaca, & De Krahne, 2004). As 
such, the PR may be a good measure for assessing nicotine’s effects on reward 
motivation. If reward responsivity is compromised during withdrawal, then it 
might be expected that withdrawn smokers’ breaking point would be much 
lower that that of satiated smokers. Because withdrawn smokers might not 
perceive the reward as “good enough” or “rewarding”, they might stop 
responding for it sooner that satiated smokers would.  
Thus, if an effect of withdrawal on reward responsivity does exist in 
humans, then the use of alternative procedures and measures might be necessary 
in order to detect it. Once the effect is detected, then researchers could examine 
whether or not the reward responsivity disturbance seen in abstinent smokers 
reflects a symptom of withdrawal. It could equally represent a deficit that 
preceded onset of regular smoking. 
 Smokers who have low reward sensitivity prior to taking up smoking 
might initiate smoking in an attempt to normalise their inherited deficit in 
reward sensitivity. For example, there is genetic evidence that low levels of 
dopaminergic function (and hence reward responsivity) prior to becoming 
highly nicotine dependent is a vulnerability factor (Noble, 1997; Noble, Jeor, & 
Ritchie, 1994). Prospective studies are needed in order to clarify whether the  
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sensitive measures of reward sensitivity (e.g., the SHAPS with an improved 
response format).  
Furthermore, in future research, more reliable and sensitive measures of 
reward sensitivity and affect could be used to examine the relationship between 
reward sensitivity and affect. Reward sensitivity might be measured using the 
CARROT task with an improved procedure, the progressive ratio procedure, the 
BAS, and/or the SHAPS with an improved response format. Affect could be 
measured using the IAPS.  The purpose of such an investigation would be to 
identify the affective impact of the indirectly reinforcing properties of nicotine.  
In addition, the effects of smoking status and dependence on reward 
responsivity (measured behaviourally) and affect could be examined 
simultaneously (as in chapter 8). In the present research, such an investigation 
was not possible because the methodology of the CARROT measure was 
different in every study. Therefore, the different data sets could not be treated as 
one in order to increase the sample size and hence the power to detect 
significant effects. 
9.3 Concluding Remarks 
There was an effect of withdrawal on improvement in performance on 
the CARROT task over a series of trials and an overall effect of withdrawal on 
CARROT performance. The effect of withdrawal on performance was 
independent of that produced by introducing a performance-contingent reward. 
Therefore, I did not replicate results from human data. Furthermore, there was 
no evidence that the difference in reward responsivity scores between satiation 
and withdrawal was bigger in higher levels of dependency. However, there was 
a main effect of dependence on some aspects of environmental pleasure/reward. 